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**Diplomová práce/Diploma Thesis:**

**Afghanistan: role of drug business in the internal conflict**

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I declare that this is my own work. Information derived from the published or unpublished work of others has been acknowledged in the text and a list of references given.

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## Introduction

During the last decades of 20<sup>th</sup> century production and illegal turnover of drugs as shady economic activity and organized, including transnational, criminality was examined in one row with local conflicts and terrorism as minor threat. Drug business is often one of the financial sources for rebel and other military groups, including organizations, which use terroristic methods. In some cases illegal activity of these groups was accomplished by stimulating by foreign special services. One of the most effective ways of achievement of financial independence for these groups had become establishment of the relations with criminal world and wider use of criminal methods – from taking hostages for redemption to taking part in drug business – for money. At the end of 20<sup>th</sup> century similar threats to the security were adopted as “small” or “off-center” – in contrast with so called serious threats, in other words military threats. However, according to the damage to the population these “new” threats can be compared with traditional threats. At the end of 20<sup>th</sup> century drug business became one of the biggest problems for the Europe. For the last three years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century capacity of heroin of Afghan origin, going to the CIS countries, for instance, increased in four times.<sup>1</sup> The majority of opiates on the market in Europe, the Near and Middle East and Africa continuing to come from Afghanistan. The number of opiates users rose to 16.5 million persons in 2006/07 due to higher estimates for Asia. The annual prevalence rate remained 0.4% of the global population aged 15 to 64. Out of these 16.5 million persons, 12 million or 0.3% of the population used heroin.<sup>2</sup> Afghanistan retook the heroin crown in 2002 from Myanmar, partly as a result of six years of bad growing conditions and stronger policing in the so-called Golden Triangle area of South-East Asia. But the latest Afghan numbers are so large that the country now accounts for 92 per cent of the illicit global opium crop.<sup>3</sup>

In spite of different control measures in these countries, these efforts are fairly limited, as long as center of the drug production is situated far away from their borders, mainly in Afghanistan, and connected with wider regional shady economic system centered in

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<sup>1</sup> International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. – US Dep. of State Bureau for International Narcotics and law Enforcement Efforts, 2002-2004

<sup>2</sup> Afghanistan: Heroin producer to the world, July 5, 2007 <http://www.cbc.ca/news/credit.html>

<sup>3</sup> UN Office for Drugs and Crime 2008 World Drug Report  
[http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR\\_2008/Executive%20Summary.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2008/Executive%20Summary.pdf)

Afghanistan. That is why study of inner situation in the countries, which are world centers of drug production and defining degree of concernment of their state economies in the regional shady economic systems, is important for more productive fight against drugs in the world.

The aim of the work is defining degree of influence of drug business on military conflict in Afghanistan, one of the biggest drug productive regions in the world. In this region interaction between drug business and conflict is more visible. I think this interaction has bilateral nature: not only drug business influences the development of the conflict but the conflict itself influences development of drug business.

In order to reach formulated aim the following tasks were defined:

- study of the interaction between drug business and military conflict in Afghanistan;
- study peculiarities of social, political and state system in Afghanistan;
- find the reason, why drug business is more favorable as a source of finance for non-governmental military groups;
- find the reason, why poppy cultivation is still more preferable than other crops;
- study extent of productiveness of anti-narcotic measures in Afghanistan.

Military conflicts are consequences of the whole complex of reasons, among which are economic factors. Drug business, for its turn, in conditions of peaceful life as well as during the military conflict, is, first of all, kind of shady economy.

From all the phases and aspects of drug business, drug traffic is closer connected with transnational economic criminality. This is the most mobile kind of drug business as well, that is why it is subjected to the influence of globalization. And if traffic is very much globalised and realized almost everywhere, production of the most profitable natural drug crops – marble flower (opium poppy) and coca, which are crude for heavy drugs as heroin and cocaine, are very much localized.

In contrast to production of synthetic drugs, which can be found everywhere, and also to production of not so profitable drug plants, for instance cannabis, which are crude for light drugs.

Regions of production of these plants are stable for years, though their centers can move from country to country and borders can change. These are so called “Andean Triangle” in the South America (Bolivia, Columbia, Peru), “Golden Crescent” in the Middle East (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran) and “Golden Triangle” in the South –East Asia (Myanmar, Laos, northern regions of Thailand and southern provinces of China).

This work is focused on Afghanistan, which is one of the centers of the world drug business. Plus Afghanistan is a zone of the old military conflict. However, this is not evidence that this conflict and drug business is connected. Nevertheless, shady regional economy is functioning in that region, and big part of it is drug business. The center of this economy is Afghanistan, place of long military conflict.

Connections between drug business and military confrontation in conflict regions along the crucial trafficking routes are attended as well. This problem is took up by the example of one of the main route of traffic – from Afghanistan to Central-Asian piece of northern, or “Silk” road.

While examine conflicts in the places like Afghanistan, which is one of the center of cultivation of drug crop and production of the most profitable natural drugs, is important to realize scales of the world drug market and global demand for drugs. The general scale of the market is huge: at the end of the 20st century annual gain from drug business was 400 billion US dollars, which is 8% of the world trade.<sup>4</sup> According to UN, at the beginning of 21st century 185 million people used drugs, which is 3% of the world population. 28 million from them used heavy natural drugs (cocaine – 13 million, opiates – 15 million, including heroine – 9 million).

In Afghanistan, as in other centers of world drug production, influence of world tendencies in the development of drug business interacted with other factors of economical, social and political nature. As the result it appeared in different ways, which defined different dynamic of development of drug business at the end of 20<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of 21<sup>st</sup> century. In Afghanistan it was steady growth of drug production and drug business as a whole. In this case from all the factors the most interesting was the role of inner conflict and military confrontation in the region of drug production.

The most difficulties were connected with sources of information, while working on topic. Basic problem is that we are talking about illegal field of shady economy, which is non-transparent by definition. The main sources of information are UN documents (surveys, reports, materials of UNODC, World Bank), together with works of W. Maley, A. McCoy, A. Rasanayagam, B. Rubin and some Russian academics.

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<sup>4</sup> World Drug Report. UN International drug Control Programme, 1997 - 2004

## Chapter 1

### The growth of narcotics production and trade in Afghanistan (1980s-mid-1990s)

#### 1.1 Influence of drug business on the inner situation in Afghanistan.

The main centers of illegal production of hashish are the Arab countries and countries of South Asia and Middle East (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Algeria, Lebanon, Turkey and Morocco). As long as cultivate cannabis<sup>5</sup> is allowed almost everywhere, regional specialization in its illegal cultivation could not be traced as effective as in case of cocaine and heroin.

By the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century more than 2/3 of world opium and its derivatives consumption, including heroin (which are 10 million addicts) was provided with Afghan opiates<sup>6</sup>. Afghanistan remains, by far, the world's largest opium producer. Afghanistan's opium production has increased steadily, from 1,570 tons in 1990 to 4,100 tons in 2004. The main disruption to this increase was the production ban<sup>7</sup> imposed by the Taliban in 2001, which was successful, at least temporarily, in reducing production (but less so in reducing exports due to the existence of large inventories). As the increase of production in Afghanistan coincided with a drop of production in the rest of the world triggered by strict bans and intensified counter-narcotics efforts, Afghanistan has become by far the world's main opium producer, with a share of world supplies that increased from 42% in 1990 to 87% in 2005.<sup>8</sup> In 2007, opium cultivation increased in both Afghanistan and Myanmar: coupled with higher yields, especially in southern Afghanistan, this generated much greater world output. The total area under opium cultivation rose up to 235,700 ha in 2007. This increase of 17% from 2006 puts global cultivation at just about the same level, though still marginally lower, than the 238,000 ha recorded in 1998.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Cannabis (Cān-na-bis) is a genus of flowering plants that includes three putative species, *Cannabis sativa* L., *Cannabis indica* Lam., and *Cannabis ruderalis* Janisch. These three taxa are indigenous to central Asia and surrounding regions. Cannabis has long been used for fibre (hemp), for medicinal purposes, and as a recreational drug. Industrial hemp products are made from Cannabis plants selected to produce an abundance of fiber and minimal levels of THC ( $\Delta^9$ - tetrahydrocannabinol), a psychoactive molecule that produces the "high" associated with marijuana. The psychoactive consists of dried flowers and leaves of plants selected to produce high levels of THC. Various extracts including hashish and hash oil are also produced from the plant

<sup>6</sup> Opiate (opid) - any of the narcotic alkaloids found in opium, as well as any derivatives of such alkaloids

<sup>7</sup> In 2001 the Taliban banned opium production, a first in Afghan history

<sup>8</sup> Afghanistan's Drug Industry. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and World Bank


<sup>9</sup> UN Office for Drugs and Crime 2008 World Drug Report

[http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR\\_2008/Executive%20Summary.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2008/Executive%20Summary.pdf)

Although there was some growth in South-East Asian poppy cultivation, the global increase was almost entirely due to the 17% expansion of cultivation in Afghanistan, which is now 193,000 ha. With Afghanistan accounting for 82% of world opium cultivation, the proportion of South-East Asian expansion in overall cultivation was small. It is not unimportant, however, as it reverses six straight years of decline. Opium poppy cultivation in Myanmar increased 29%, from 21,500 ha in 2006 to 27,700 ha, in 2007. Afghanistan’s higher yielding opium poppy led to a second year of global opium production increases. Opium production almost doubled between 2005 and 2007, reaching 8,870 mt in 2007, a level unprecedented in recent years. In 2007, Afghanistan alone accounted for over 92% of global opium production.<sup>10</sup>

The area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan rose by 17% in 2007 to 193,000 ha. This was the largest area under opium poppy cultivation ever recorded in Afghanistan, surpassing the 2006 record cultivation figure. The increase itself was less pronounced than in 2006, when the increase was 33%. Similar to the year before, Afghanistan accounted for 82% of the global area under opium poppy in 2007. Over two thirds of the opium poppy cultivation was located in the southern region of the country.<sup>11</sup>

Fig. 14: Global opium poppy cultivation (hectares), 1990-2006



Source: UN Office on Drugs and Crime 2007 World Drug Report

Drugs, produced in Afghanistan, are traditionally distributed by different routes. The main route “Golden Route” (more than 60% of all exported drugs) goes through Pakistan to the harbors. There drugs are loaded on the ships and delivered thorough out the world. On the second place by the export is a Central-Asian boarder of Afghanistan (30% of export). From there drugs go to Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The Balkan Route

<sup>10</sup> UN Office for Drugs and Crime 2008 World Drug Report  
[http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR\\_2008/Executive%20Summary.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2008/Executive%20Summary.pdf)

<sup>11</sup> Ibid



supplies 98 % of drugs to Europe. The forth route goes to Iran, Turkey and Arab countries of the Middle East. Today the situation can be changed, because Pakistan and Iran have strengthened the protection of the border, in both countries a campaign against drugs has began.<sup>12</sup> (See Appendix 1)

International experts have noted the raucous increase in supply of Afghan heroin in Russia and Ukraine during recent years. In previous time the territories of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus were just transit on the way to Europe. Now they became suppliers and the threat of “opium expansion” can become bigger in the future. The transparent Russian borders with Central Asia would help.

According to the UNODC, there are an estimated 11 million heroin addicts around the world, 3.3 million of those in Europe and at least 1.6 million in Iran, a likely product of the pass-through of Afghan heroin. Afghan heroin mostly supplies markets in neighboring countries as well as the Middle East, Europe and parts of Africa. Heroin is, in many respects, yesterday's drug. Opiates are still the recreational drug of choice in Europe, followed by grass, whereas North American's are more prone to indulge in cocaine and cannabis, almost in equal amounts.<sup>13</sup>

UN, in its turn, is very alarmed by the situation in Afghanistan. In 2003 UN Security Council Mission was in Afghanistan. It was there since the 31<sup>st</sup> of October till the 7<sup>th</sup> of November. In the report it says: “Many interlocutors, including President Hamid Karzai and Foreign Minister Abdullah, listed drug production and trafficking as a major source of instability. Drug production and trafficking feed terrorism, criminality and corruption. Mr. Brahimi underscored that the magnitude of the problem could lead to Afghanistan becoming a narco-state. As described by Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani, the production of opium is draining resources from Afghanistan because it results in larger defense, health and economic costs. He urged the international community to provide prosecutable evidence, which would contribute to the isolation of the perpetrators. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is leading international assistance

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<sup>12</sup> Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Counter-narcotics Directorate of the Government of Afghanistan. – UN Office for Drugs and Control and crime Prevention, October 2003

<sup>13</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2007 World Drug Report  
[http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/wdr07/WDR\\_2007.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/wdr07/WDR_2007.pdf)

to the Afghan Transitional Administration in the narcotic drugs sector through institution-building, law enforcement, demand reduction and comprehensive measures to promote alternative livelihoods. Representatives of NGOs said that the lack of resources for economic development and the low prices of alternative crops had contributed to the increase in the cultivation of poppies. Senior Transitional Administration officials and NGO representatives emphasized the need for a comprehensive program of action to combat drug production and trafficking. Furthermore, they highlighted the need for increased cooperation from neighboring States in that regard. At the same time, it was clear that there was no single solution that would quickly resolve the issue. Progress in counter-narcotics was not possible without parallel progress in security, reconstruction and extension of the authority of the central Government. Since drugs originating from Afghanistan had a significant impact on end-user markets, there was a need to strengthen drug control efforts beyond Afghanistan, including along the borders. The mission commends the initial efforts made by the Afghan Government in counter-narcotics, and calls for a sustained, coordinated and comprehensive effort to combat drug production and trafficking.”<sup>14</sup>

Also in 2004 General Assembly accepted a resolution “Emergency international assistance for peace, normalcy and reconstruction of war-stricken Afghanistan and the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security”. UN asked the international society to enlarge financial and technical support for Afghanistan, in order to realize its national fight against drugs and reduce in that way the demand for narcotics in Afghanistan and threat to the world in general, stability and socio-economical development of Afghanistan, security of this region and other regions of the world, which is generated by the illegal cultivation of poppy and production of opiates.

Clearly Afghanistan has the right conditions for widespread opium poppy cultivation not only in agronomic terms (hence the particularly high yields obtained) but also socio-economically and politically - i.e. weak governance, insecurity, and the lack of viable legal livelihoods.

However, although these characteristics are prevalent across the country, opium poppy occupies a small part of total agricultural land in Afghanistan. Cultivation levels and trends are also far from uniform: in some areas the level of cultivation rises exponentially even while falling in the neighboring province or district; in another district opium poppy

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<sup>14</sup> Report of the Security Council mission to Afghanistan, 31 October to 7 November 2003

<<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/606/22/PDF/N0360622.pdf?OpenElement>>

will be a long-established crop, while right next door cultivation will have just begun, or is still non-existent. But officials in neighboring countries say the size and frequency of drug seizures from smugglers near the Afghan border continues to increase - highlighting the fact that many Afghan farmers who have stopped growing opium poppies are now growing cannabis crops instead.

Perhaps we should not be surprised by these different patterns and trends in opium poppy cultivation at the provincial and district levels. After all, Afghanistan is a country of great diversity in language, terrain, climate, and culture. In particular, political structures, economic opportunities, and livelihood strategies are highly localized. Given such diversity, it would be wrong to assume that households from different socio-economic groups in different areas would respond to the opportunities that opium poppy cultivation might offer in the same way.<sup>15</sup>

An important role in transaction to the common drug production in Afghanistan during the last decades of 20<sup>th</sup> century was played by military conflict and “war economy” connected with it. The history of interaction and interference between military conflict and drug business in Afghanistan might be conditionally divided in three periods: the beginning of civil war in 1970s - mid 1990s, including so called “Soviet time” and following Mujahedeen period; Taliban time mid 1990s – 2001; post-Taliban time 2001 – present day.

## **1.2 Increase in production and trade of drugs in Afghanistan in 1980s – first part of 1990s.**

1980s – beginning of 1990s is the time of extensive opium production in Afghanistan. This fact can’t be explained only by the combination of natural and climatic conditions of Afghanistan with economical conjecture of world shady markets and increasing demand for drugs, which stimulated increase of supply and need of crude. These conditions were typical and for other countries, which, however, didn’t become centers of international drug production. We can hardly think of drug boom in 20<sup>th</sup> century as the result of state politics in Afghanistan and important historical, geographical and other factors, which were disturbing consolidation of Afghanistan.<sup>16</sup> The history of clannish-tribal and feudal division on the territory, formatting the present Afghanistan, runs to

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<sup>15</sup> Afghanistan’s Drug Industry. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and World Bank

<sup>16</sup> Opium Economy in Afghanistan: An International Problem. UNODC Report. UN Pub. No. E. 03. XI. 6, 2003. – 226 P.

several hundred years. Many Pashtun tribes<sup>17</sup> in Afghanistan recognized central Afghan authorities, its laws and imposed taxes only nominally. In the East state control was particularly weak or was absent at all.

However, despite high level of division, weakness of central authorities and conditional character of internal borders, drug production in Afghanistan was minimal up to 20<sup>th</sup> century. The extensive opium production began in conditions of evaluating Civil War in the end of 1970s. This was a contraction to People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan regime, and Soviet troops subsequently, which was actively supported by external powers. However, PDPA arrival to power and following intervention didn't lead to the collapse of authorities, their functions were blurring as far as military resistance of different Islamic oppositions was activated and central power over agricultural regions was lost. Even greater increase of drug production appeared when Soviet Union withdrew its troops and Kabul regime collapsed. It was time of total degradation of Afghan State, intestine clashes, political, social and economical crisis, including shaped during that time "economy of war".

Several factors have contributed to Afghanistan's prominence in opium production:

*Favorable cultivation conditions:* Owing to favorable conditions, yields in Afghanistan have been consistently higher than in other opium-producing countries.

*High morphine content:* In many opium producing countries, notably in Southeast Asia, about 10 kg of opium is needed to produce one kilo of heroin. However, the transformation yields are much higher in Afghanistan, where on average only 6 to 7 kg of opium are needed to produce one kilo of heroin. The morphine content of opium ranges from 8-24%. The highest opium content was observed in the province of Badakhshan (slightly more than 16% on average). It is worth noting that this high morphine content may be partly offset by inefficiencies in processing opium.

*Insecurity and institutional weaknesses:* The almost complete collapse of central government after the Soviet withdrawal, the warring parties' need for alternative sources of financing, and the fact that opium was a crop well adapted to the prevailing circumstances, greatly contributed to the development of opium cultivation.

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<sup>17</sup> Pashtuns (Pashto: پښتون *Paṣṭūn*, *Paxtūn*, also rendered as Pushtuns, Pakhtuns, Pukhtuns), also called Pathans (Urdu: پٹان *Paṭhān*), ethnic Afghans, are an Eastern Iranian ethno-linguistic group with populations primarily in Afghanistan and in the North-West Frontier Province, Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Balochistan provinces of western Pakistan. The Pashtuns are typically characterized by their usage of the Pashto language and practice of Pashtunwali, which is a traditional code of conduct and honor

*Poor infrastructure:* Opium is relatively drought-resistant, making its cultivation easier than wheat in areas where irrigation is limited. Moreover, dry opium is easy to store and transport, which, given the poor state of roads and stocking facilities in Afghanistan, gives it an advantage over other crops.

*Rural poverty:* The decision by many farmers to cultivate opium is primarily dictated by the lack of alternative sustainable livelihoods. Moreover, traders/traffickers often provide farmers with the necessary inputs (seeds, fertilizers) and financing, and take delivery of opium at the farm gate, relieving farmers from transportation or storage. While some other products (nuts, orchards) may generate higher revenues, they require substantial multi-year investments and infrastructure that many farmers cannot afford.<sup>18</sup>

### 1.3 Economical consequences of the conflict.

Before the upheavals following so-called Saur Revolution of April 1978, the population of Afghanistan was estimated at some 15 million. 85% of the people were either peasants who made precarious living off the land, or nomads. The nomads subsisted chiefly on their herds of livestock, exchanging their products for the agricultural produce of the villages they passed through in their annual migrations. Some groups, such as those from among the eastern Pashtuns, ignored international frontiers during these treks. They were annual traders, and some even became money lenders to the sedentary farmers.<sup>19</sup> At the same time opium production rose gradually in Afghanistan. It was swinging from 90 tons to 270 tons per year, comparing to the opium production in Pakistan. As was said before, 1978-1979 years were the beginning of extensive opium production in Afghanistan. At the end of 1970s 85% of all Afghan population was living in rural areas. Landownership dominated in the country: during 1970s – 1980s 1146 farmers owned more than 3 million ha (68% of all cultivated land) while 54 thousand of middle landowners and agrarians owned about 1.4 million ha (32% of all cultivated lands), renting their lands to the peasants.<sup>20</sup>

In outdated agrarian state series of radical PDPA decrees in sphere of social and agricultural relations – Decree №6 (July 1978) on shortening of number of landless and land-poor peasants; Decree №7 (October 1978) on reformation of traditional family and matrimonial relations, abolition of bride-money; Decree №8 (November 1978) on

<sup>18</sup> Afganistan's Drug Industry. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and World Bank

<sup>19</sup> Afghanistan. A modern history. A. Rasanayagam. I.B. Tauris 2005. 311 p

<sup>20</sup> Афганистан: справочник/ Отв. ред. А.В. Давыдов. – М.: ИВ РАН, 2000. – 256 С.

liquidation of big landlords, etc. – didn't have success among the population. Once in power, the party implemented a new socialist agenda. The government promoted state atheism. Men were obliged to cut off their beards, women were not allowed to wear burqa<sup>21</sup> any longer, and most of the mosques were placed off limits at the start of the regime. The mosques re-opened in the 1980s, because the party tried to win more supporters. The government also carried out a new land reform among others.<sup>22</sup>

When the PDPA rose to power in Afghanistan they moved prohibition of traditional practices which were deemed feudal by the party. They banned bride price and forced marriage among others and the minimum age for marriage was raised. They also stressed the importance of education in Afghanistan. The government stressed education for both women and men; they also set up anti-literacy programs in the country. These new reforms were not well-received by the majority of the Afghan population (particularly in rural areas). As many saw it was un-Islamic and was seen as a forced approach to western culture in Afghan society as many tribal societies in Afghanistan tend to be conservative.<sup>23</sup> The urban population in Afghanistan supported the modernization of the community and country but was against the Soviet occupation.<sup>24</sup>

Repressions against religious authorities in the country, where Islam was the way of life, didn't increase authority of new power either. These facts were fully used by Islamic opposition, which was counted on peasantry as basic focus group.

Traditionally weak control of central government over the situation in the regions, particularly in agricultural areas, was attenuated even more when confrontation with ruling authorities and Soviet troops began. Degradation of traditional agricultural production and depopulation of agricultural areas were straight on connected with the consequences of the military conflict. During ten years – since 1979 till 1989 – more than half of villages had

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<sup>21</sup> Burqa (also transliterated burkha, burka or burqua from Arabic: **برقع** *burqu'*) is an enveloping outer garment worn by women in some Islamic traditions for the purpose of cloaking the entire body. It is worn over the usual daily clothing (often a long dress or a *shalwar kameez*) and removed when the woman returns to the sanctuary of the household

<sup>22</sup> John Ishiyama. "The Sickie and the Minaret: Communist Successor Parties in Yemen and Afghanistan after the Cold War". The Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA).  
<http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2005/issue1/jv9no1a2.html>.

<sup>23</sup> "Women in Afghanistan: Pawns in men's power struggles". Amnesty International.  
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA11/011/1999/en/dom-ASA110111999en.html>.

<sup>24</sup> John Kifner. "Man in the News; A Tough Ox For Afghans: Najibullah". The New York Times.  
<http://www.nytimes.com/1987/12/02/world/man-in-the-news-a-tough-ox-for-afghans-najibullah.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all>.

been fired on, 9% of population had died, 1/3 fled from the country. Agricultural crisis, devastation and military actions forwarded the urbanization. The city population grew with accelerated speed. For 12 years since the beginning of the conflict the population of Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif doubled, and became 1.5 and half a million correspondingly, the population of Herat in the beginning of 1990s more than doubled, from 150 thousand to 350 thousand.<sup>25</sup> Regress of traditional agriculture stimulated search of new livelihoods in the conditions of war, which lead to the development of particular sectors of agriculture, including cultivation of legal crops (rice), as well as illegal (opium poppy). That favored the enrichment of particular groups of population and became one of the most effective strategies of livelihoods for peasants and farmers.

Despite the prevailing level of poverty, rural livelihoods in Afghanistan have proven resilient in the face of more than two decades of war and a protracted drought. Rural households in Afghanistan have been found to draw on a range of different strategies to manage the risks and uncertainties that they face as part of their day-to-day life. A number of rich sources of data suggest that rural livelihood strategies in Afghanistan are complex and diverse and that they vary not only across the country but within the same province or even district. Even within a single village, different households draw upon diverse income sources depending on their specific assets and capabilities as well as on seasonal opportunities.

The distribution of assets in rural Afghanistan is closely related to geography. Provinces such as Nangarhar and Helmand have far better natural conditions than the more mountainous provinces of Ghor and Badakhshan. Nangarhar in particular, given its temperate climate and its close proximity to markets in both Kabul and Peshawar in Pakistan, offers households a large number of livelihood options. Possibilities include, for example, production of a range of agricultural crops including high-value horticulture and fruit production; sale of livestock and livestock products; the transportation and trade of agricultural and nonagricultural goods; skilled and semi-skilled employment in the construction industry (in Jalalabad, Kabul, and Peshawar); as well as income from the smuggling of licit and illicit goods. The range of livelihood options and the number of opportunities in each sector, are much more limited for the inhabitants of Ghor province, who find themselves cut off by snow for up to five months of the year and for whom livestock and remittances from Iran form the bedrock of their livelihood strategies.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Давыдов А.В. Афганистан: войны могло не быть. Крестьянство и реформы/ ИВ РАН. – М.: Наука, 1993. – 178 С.

<sup>26</sup> Afghanistan's Drug Industry. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and World Bank

As the whole for years of PDPA government and soviet presence in Afghanistan the shady economy has fully and finally formatted. On one hand, “urban economy”, oriented on USSR, soviet economic and humanitarian aid, forwarded its formation. On the other hand, shady transit economy, integrated in regional shady economy, had been roughly developed along the routes, leading to Pakistan and Iran, especially in abuttal zones. And if “urban economy” was controlled by the state, shady transit economy dominated in the zones, controlled by the Islamic opposition. One of the basics of the second economy model became growth of drug production and drug trade.

In the absence of savings and other sources of financing, many farmers resort to borrowing, primarily from shopkeepers, traders, and relatives, to finance their intermediate consumption (seeds and fertilizers) and the hiring of production factors (such as day workers and tractors), as well as for household consumption requirements prior to the harvest.

The most common form of credit is salaam, an advance on a fixed amount of expected future agricultural production, which is typically contracted at the beginning of the cultivation season and paid back, through delivery of opium, after the harvest. The drug economy, which is excluded from reported GDP, generates demand for domestic products. Although not recorded in official balance of payments data, it also has a net positive impact on the balance of payments. For many farmers, opium is the main cash crop, whereas other crops are cultivated primarily to meet subsistence needs. It is generally assumed that farmers spend most of their income, and that opium-related income contributes primarily to higher consumption, in particular of non-subsistence goods including imported goods. These estimates are based on the assumption that opium exports have increased regularly over the last ten years and that inventories amounted to 15 months of exports prior to the ban enacted by the Taliban in 2001. These estimates may be conservative, as some experts consider that after four years of high production, stocks have likely returned to their pre-2001 level and amount to at least one year of exports. Some of the traffickers' income is also believed to be recycled in formal and informal activities, such as trade/smuggling. Investments abroad are facilitated by the informal financial sector in Afghanistan: money-changers (hawalars) provide low-cost, largely unregulated, and efficient transfer services to other countries.<sup>27</sup>

Owing to its labor-intensive nature, the drug economy does not crowd out investment in other sectors. However, the drug economy affects investment primarily through its negative impact on Afghanistan's investment climate. This manifests itself

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<sup>27</sup> Afghanistan's Drug Industry. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and World Bank



mainly through insecurity; sustained growth of informal activities; very high levels of corruption particularly at provincial and district levels (either directly through participation, or indirectly through "taxation"); and weak sub-national administrations. A significant part of opium-related consumption and investment is on imported goods and services. Moreover, a large part of opium export receipts, primarily at the processor/trafficker level, is believed to be invested abroad. Owing to their illicit nature, most drug-related activities (production, processing, trade) are not directly taxed. Their primary impact on fiscal revenue results, therefore, from indirect taxation of consumption and imports financed by drug receipts, mainly through import duties.<sup>28</sup>

#### **1.4 Social-economic resources of Islamic opposition.**

If there was one thing predictable following the Soviet invasion, it was that Soviet forces would encounter significant popular resistance. Popular resistance to an occupying force is by no means inevitable. And in many cases of foreign occupation, significant elements of the population of the occupied country have opted either to collaborate or to remain passive, either because of a lack of interest in politics, or from a desire to move with the currents of prevailing winds. In Afghanistan's case, determined resistance emerged, particularly in rural areas where the writ of the state was weak. Resistance was motivated by a range of factors, including calculations of interest, but the power of Islam as a basis of resistance proved of fundamental importance. Religions can provide a basis for resistance in at least two different ways. On the one hand, religious doctrines and practices may endow certain individuals with authority, which they can then use to lead others in a political struggle. On the other hand, religion can serve as an ideology of resistance, by proving direct legitimacy to resistance in certain circumstances, even in the absence of authoritative figures to exercise a leadership role. On the whole, the role of 'authoritative religious leaders' was somewhat limited in Afghanistan: Sunni<sup>29</sup> Islam lacks a 'clergy', or indeed a hierarchical leadership, and authoritative figures were thus more to be found in Afghanistan's Shia<sup>30</sup> minority, and in spiritual Sufi<sup>31</sup> brotherhoods. But as an ideology of resistance, Islam was to prove extraordinarily important.

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<sup>28</sup> Afghanistan's Drug Industry. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and World Bank

<sup>29</sup> Muslims who adhere to orthodox traditions.

<sup>30</sup> Shia believe in Muhammad's son-in-law Ali and the Imams who followed him as the rightful successors of Muhammad and advocate a religious and political ideology based on guidance by Imams.

<sup>31</sup> Sufism or *tasawwuf*, as it is called in Arabic, is generally understood by scholars and Sufis to be the inner, mystical, or psycho-spiritual dimension of Islam.

This ideology was shaped in the crucible of the early Muslim community in the Arabian Peninsula, where unbelievers represented a serious threat to the survival of the Prophet and his followers. The term which emerged to describe resistance to such attacks was jihad. From the same Arabic root as jihad were then derived the words mujahed, and its plural mujahedeen, which identify practitioners of jihad. The word 'mujahedeen' came to use as a generic term for the Afghan resistance and its various components.

The Afghan resistance as its outset was basically a grassroots movement. The bulk of Afghan Muslims who initially took up arms against the USSR and its clients were not Muslim intellectuals, but practitioners of what one can call 'village Islam', which scorned atheism and defined apostasy as departure from ritual. The Soviets were widely known to be atheists, and this damned them and their associates in the eyes of many Afghan villagers. This distaste for atheism tended to be reinforced by a concern for both the independence of Afghanistan as a political unit, and a desire for personal autonomy which the assertion of state power would compromise, but it was the Soviets' avowed atheism which created a moral basis for opposition. It helped turn what were pockets of resistance, albeit substantial ones, into a more full-fledged insurgency, albeit one with its own distinctive rhythm.<sup>32</sup>

The main leading force in Islamic opposition was Islamic fundamentalist movement, received new forceful impulse to development after the April revolution in 1978. There were two biggest resistance groups. One was connected with the Jamiat-i-Islami<sup>33</sup> of Burhanuddin Rabbani, the Tajik from Badakhshan, who had succeeded Nyazi, the founder of the party executed by Daoud, had a Sufi background, and attended a state madrassa<sup>34</sup> before going on to study in Ankara and graduate at Al-Azhar<sup>35</sup> in Cairo. He enjoyed great personal prestige as a versatile Islamic intellectual, but his cautious and conciliatory approach resulted in an early split with the younger and more radical elements within the

<sup>32</sup> Afghanistan wars. William Maley. Palgrave Macmillan. New York.2002. 340 pp

<sup>33</sup> Islamic Party. Jamiat-i Islami was one of the original Islamist parties in Afghanistan, established in the 1970s by students at Kabul University where its leader, Burhanuddin Rabbani, was a lecturer at the Islamic Law Faculty. Rabbani is an ethnic Tajik (Persian-speaking Sunni Muslim). The group's ethnic power base has been in the Parwan and Takhar provinces in the northeast. The group has received significant military and other support from Iran and Russia.

<sup>34</sup> Madrassa - Islamic school that teaches primarily religious subjects, Islamic law, and math.

<sup>35</sup> Al-Azhar University (pronounced "AZ-har", Arabic: *جامعة الأزهر*; *Al-ʿAzhar al-Šarīf*, "the Noble Azhar") in Egypt, founded in 975, is the chief centre of Arabic literature and Sunni Islamic learning in the world and the world's second oldest surviving degree granting university. It is associated with Al-Azhar mosque in Islamic Cairo. The university's mission includes the propagation of Islamic religion and culture.

Jamiat, led by autocratic and unscrupulous Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. He later formed the second largest resistance party, called the Hizbi-i-Islami<sup>36</sup>. It was tightly organized according to a Stalinist model, with a cell structure and a pyramidal chain of authority with himself as an apex. Hakmatyar was a detribalized Ghilzai Pashtun from Kunduz with a rather narrow base of support, and as Islamic purist seeking to eradicate traditional Pashtun customs and practices, including consensual decision-making. Although he was chosen eventually by Pakistan as her protégé during the jihad, he was never very popular with the mainstream, tribally organized Pashtuns.<sup>37</sup> Both Rabbani and Hekmatyar had to leave the country during the Daoud government. In 1979 another splinter group had emerged, this time from within the Hizbi-i-Islami. It was led by Maulana Younis Khalis, a tribal leader from Paktia province with a radical Islamic agenda inspired by the Deobandi School<sup>38</sup> near Dehli where he had been trained, as had several generations Afghan ulema<sup>39</sup> before him. He had a following of traditional religious leaders and village mullahs in the south-east. Mullah Omar, the future leader of the Taliban, fought in the ranks of Khali's mujahideen later in jihad. A fourth Islamic party, the Ittehad-i-Islami<sup>40</sup>, was formed by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a lecturer in theology at Kabul University who had been released from prison by the communist government and had fled to Pakistan in 1979. His party had no territorial base but had strong financial support from Saudi Arabia, whose extreme Wahhabi<sup>41</sup> and anti-Shia ideology he shared. Another party that emerged was the Harakat-e-Inqilab-

<sup>36</sup> Party of Islam . A Mujahideen leader, Gulbuddin Hikmetyar, founded Hizb-i Islami, which is a secretive, centralized political party whose members are largely urban Pashtuns. It has received support from Saudi Arabia.

<sup>37</sup> Afghanistan. A modern history. A. Rasanayagam. I.B. Tauris 2005. 311 p

<sup>38</sup> The Deobandi (Urdu: دہلوی دین دہلوی *deobandī*) is a Sunni Muslim Islamic revivalist movement which has recently spread to many countries, such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, South Africa and the United Kingdom

<sup>39</sup> Ulema (علماء, transliteration: 'Ulamā', singular: عالم, transliteration: 'Ālim, "scholar") refers to the educated class of Muslim legal scholars engaged in the several fields of Islamic studies. They are best known as the arbiters of Shari'a law. While the ulema are well versed in legal jurisprudence being Islamic lawyers, some of them also go on to specialize in other fields, such as philosophy, dialectical theology or Quranic hermeneutics or explanation. The fields studied, and the importance given them, will vary from tradition to tradition, or even from seminary to seminary

<sup>40</sup> The Islamic Dawah Organisation of Afghanistan (Persian: سازمان اسلامی توحید و می‌ظنت *Tanzim-e Dahwat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan*) is a political party in Afghanistan led by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. Founded in the late 1970s as the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan

<sup>41</sup> Wahhabi (Arabic: Al-Wahhābiyya (وهبى بآول) or Wahhabism is a conservative form of Sunni Islam attributed to Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, an 18th century scholar from what is today known as Saudi Arabia, who advocated a return to the practices of the first three generations of Islamic history.

Islami<sup>42</sup> of Maulana Mohhamad Nabi Mohammedi, an Islamic scholar with a strong following among the ulema and mullahs<sup>43</sup> who had led the early uprisings against the communist regime. But lacking a territorial base or organization capacity, the party's adherents later drifted into the ranks of other mujahedeen parties. The last two of the seven Afghan parties recognized by the Pakistani government in 1980 as eligible for material support in the war in Afghanistan were associated with the two most important Sufi orders in Afghanistan: Sighbatullah Mujaddedi of the Naqshbandi, and Pir Sayyed Ahmad Gailani of the Qadiriya. They drew their followers from among those who venerated their ancient Sufi lineage. Their parties were not strictly Islamist. The two leaders also had family ties to the former royal establishment and professional classes. They, along with Nabi, were usually described as "moderates", as opposed to the "radicals" leading the four other Islamic parties.<sup>44</sup> And while first fundamentalist groups wanted to lead jihad and make Islamic state from Afghanistan, this part of the opposition, in spite of Islamic rhetoric, wanted restoration of Daoud's customs in form of Soviet state.

Discontent of new authorities' actions, particularly PDPA politics in sphere of social and religious relations, taken as anti-Islamic by the most part of population, and efforts of radical agrarian reforms, was spread not only among elite but also among farmers, which made them available for the influence of Islamic opposition. If country people of Afghanistan were less movable and lived quiet isolated life before the war, during the war millions of them became refugees. Mass flow of Afghan refugees to Pakistan and Iran had allowed Islamic opposition to expand its social base. By the end of 1980s there were almost 6 million Afghan refugees. However, Afghan refugees in Pakistan were called 'replaced' among the Islamic opposition, which made their resettlement religious-political protest. In 1985 a Seven Party Alliance was formed, it united all Peshawar-based parties, traditional and fundamentalist. The principal that every mujahedeen commander in the field belongs to one of the seven parties was established.

Opposition was supported by considerable part of farmers, who stayed in the country. Taxes and donations from those people became one of inner finance sources for mujahedeen. At the beginning support of mujahedeen was voluntary and irregular.

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<sup>42</sup> Islamic Movement of Afghanistan. Harakat is a Shiite party that never joined Hizb-i Wahdat. It is led by Ayatollah Muhammad Asif Muhsini and was allied with Jamiat-i Islami in 1993-1995. Its leadership is mostly non-Hazara Shiite. Its most prominent commander is General Anwari. The group has received support from Iran.

<sup>43</sup> A religious leader; trained in Muslim religious law and doctrine.

<sup>44</sup> Afghanistan. A modern history. A. Rasanayagam. I.B. Tauris 2005. 311 p

However, mujahedeen started to make it more regular in controlled provinces with time. All the mujahedeen taxes were considered as Islamic though, they not always corresponded to Islamic norms and traditions. In the most general view there were khums<sup>45</sup> and zakah<sup>46</sup>. The military resistance groups had considerable difficulties connected with collection of taxes from controlled territories. Taxes were collected irregularly and not from all the territories. Only commanders who had enough power could have provided relative regularity of tax inflow.

The external support of the Seven Party Alliance came from USA, Arab countries, mostly Saudi Arabia, and western countries through Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The Pakistani Army became the prime channel through which external military assistance was directed to Afghan resistance groups, and the process was easier to manage because Pakistan was under military rule for most of the period of the Soviet-Afghan war. At the heart of the Pakistani Army was the Afghan Bureau of the ISI. The ISI itself was remarkably unencumbered by checks and balances, even in comparison to other intelligence agencies. Its Afghanistan operations were dependent on total secrecy, partly because of Pakistan's desire to avoid Soviet reprisals for military activities against the Afghan communist regime orchestrated from Pakistani soil, but also because the USA put great store on 'plausible deniability' as an element of covert operations in Afghanistan.<sup>47</sup> The respective roles of the CIA and the ISI's Afghan Bureau are the best summed up by the army officer personally selected by Akhtar in October 1983 to head the Bureau, Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf: "To sum up: the CIA's tasks in Afghanistan were to purchase arms and equipment and their transportation to Pakistan; provide funds for the purchase of vehicles and transportation inside Pakistan and Afghanistan; train Pakistani instructors on new weapons or equipment; provide satellite photographs and maps for our operational planning; provide radio equipment and training, and advise on technical matters when requested. The entire planning of the war, all types of training for the

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<sup>45</sup> Khums (خمس IPA: [xɒms]) is the Arabic word for One Fifth (1/5). According to Shia Islamic legal terminology, it means "one-fifth of certain items which a person acquires as wealth, and which must be paid as an Islamic tax

<sup>46</sup> Zakāh or "alms for the poor" (Arabic: زكاة IPA: [zækæh]) is the Islamic principle of giving a percentage of one's income to charity. It is often compared to the system of tithing and alms, but it serves principally as the welfare contribution to poor and deprived people in the Muslim lands, although others may have a rightful share. Zakat's similar-sounding, Arabic language analog is the Hebrew word Tzedakah, the charitable obligation in ancient Israel through to present day Judaism. It is the duty of the Islamic state not just to collect Zakat, but to distribute it fairly as well. Zakat is one of the Five Pillars of Islam.

<sup>47</sup> Afghanistan wars. William Maley. Palgrave Macmillan. New York.2002. 340 pp

mujahedeen, and the allocation and distribution of arms and supplies were the sole responsibility of the ISI, and my office in particular.”<sup>48</sup>

Beyond Pakistani involvement, the Afghan resistance also received support through international channels. The forms which this assistance took varied from the strictly moral to humanitarian and material, but each was important in its own way, and served to keep Afghanistan issue alive.<sup>49</sup>

Some support was provided by China, Japan, Israel and other countries, and Iran had played the main role in supporting groups based in Afghanistan. CIA not only supported mujahedeen with weapons, finances, machines, and arms, and used so called “humanitarian aid” as source of finance, but also encouraged usage of shady sources of finance, including drug business, or at least shut their eyes to these actions. During 1980s DAE (Drug Enforcement Administration) office in Islamabad didn’t make anything notable. According to Ch. Cogan “USA has sacrificed fight against drugs to priorities of Cold War and fight against Soviet presence in Afghanistan.”<sup>50</sup> And at the same time, in contrast to, for instance, military operation in Vietnam, USA didn’t openly participate in drug business in Afghanistan; let the ISI to have the leading role.<sup>51</sup>

### **1.5 Formation of opium politics: resource of the conflict.**

At the beginning of 1980s those provinces of Afghanistan, where opium poppy has been already cultivated, were found under control of Islamic opposition. Parallel to this, Iranian opium ban, which was initiated after the revolution in 1979, and Turkish opium ban in 1972, had coincided with temporary rough fall of opium production, as the result of two-year drought in South-East Asia<sup>52</sup> – “Golden Triangle”<sup>53</sup> region - which was the main source of opiates in the world. In these conditions Afghanistan and Pakistan became

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<sup>48</sup> Yousaf, Brigadier Mahammad and Major Mark Adkin, *The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story*, Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1992

<sup>49</sup> *Afghanistan wars*. William Maley. Palgrave Macmillan. New York. 2002. 340 pp

<sup>50</sup> McCoy A. *Drug Fallout: the CIA’s Forty Year Complicity in the Narcotics Trade*// *the Progressive*. – 1997

<sup>51</sup> McCoy A. *Historical Review of Opium/ Heroin Production*. Interim Draft Final Report. – Schaffer Library for Drug Policy, 1995. <<http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/heroin/historic.htm>

<sup>52</sup> *Myanmar Opium Survey 2004*. Report by UNODC and Myanmar Central Comm. for Drug Abuse Control UNODC, Oct. 2004

<sup>53</sup> The Golden Triangle is one of Asia's two main illicit opium-producing areas. It is an area of around 350,000 square kilometres that overlaps the mountains of four countries of Southeast Asia: Myanmar (Burma), Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand. (Other interpretations of the Golden Triangle also include a section of Yunnan Province, China.)

alternative sources of opiates, capable to fill the niche at the world market. However, while in Pakistan extreme poppy cultivation was neutralized with the help of strict state policy and USA pressure, in Afghanistan that impulse to growth of opium production, in conditions of on-going conflict and external support, had shaped into fast development. Together with weapons and trans-regional smuggling opium became one of few profitable goods in Afghanistan, and opium business became one of the financial sources for opposition. As the result opium production in Afghanistan increased from 200 tons to 575 tons since 1980 till 1983.<sup>54</sup> Poppy cultivation needed less water, than other crops, and it could have been cultivated in most provinces of Afghanistan. Unpretentiousness of poppy combined with profitability. In particular provinces it could have brought 30 times more profit than wheat and 40 times more than cotton.

However, from the economic point of view the growth of poppy cultivation can hardly be explained only by great profit. First of all, even in Afghan conditions, in some provinces, which switched to poppy cultivation, cultivation of not less profitable crops was possible, for instance, apricots, apples, pomegranates, melons, caraway, grapes. Second, taking into account, that for poppy cultivation are suitable almost all territory of the country, it was cultivated only on small part (1-3%) of all cultivated land. Obviously, if profit was the main reason it would be cultivated more widely, especially in the provinces controlled by opposition. Moreover, nowhere it became a single-crop; it never took more than 70% of the land. There were other social and economic factors, which influenced the growth of poppy cultivation. Firstly, opium production gave access to land, water and market. Afghanistan still was a state of peasants' landownership. And land distribution among peasants was basically even more than in Pakistan and India. However, in Afghanistan, particularly in the South, the number of landless peasants grew gradually, and they were migrating within the country to find a job. Exactly in those regions, where problem of shortage of land was the most relevant, drug production has been developing rapidly. In those places where the irrigation system was absent or destroyed poppy cultivation had no alternative. So in the North of Helmand, where land were more split up, irrigation system and market were difficult to access, poppy cultivation was more famous than in the South of the same province. Poppy cultivation literally provided access to the land for peasants, and usually it was landlord who dictated the crop priorities, and it was opium poppy. Secondly, opium production provided an access to loan system. In the

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<sup>54</sup> McCoy A. Historical Review of Opium/ Heroin Production. Interim Draft Final Report. – Schaffer Library for Drug Policy, 1995. <<http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/heroin/historic.htm>

conditions of on-going war, devaluation of national currency and absence of formal banking and credit system, relatively stable opium prices and simplicity of storage made it ideal form of savings, cash and source of loans. Thereby this loan drew farmers into opium production more and more, and creates the whole group of “drug money-lenders”.<sup>55</sup> These people lent money for future opium crops. Thirdly, poppy cultivation brought profit to the farmers, who rented spare land, with the condition of free labor or family labor (women, children).

Poppy cultivation is very labor-intensive. 350 man-days are spent for 1 ha of poppy, while for 1 ha of wheat is only 41 man-days.<sup>56</sup> Labor expenses for poppy cultivation were partly compensated due to women and child labor. Naturally, for farmers, who were not able to hire extra workers, poppy cultivation was not so attractive.

It has to be taken into account, that poppy cultivation as well as opium trading was not criminal actions in many Afghan provinces. Representatives of almost all ethnic groups cultivated opium poppy. But at the same time usage of opium and hashish, which was more widespread, including as traditional medicine, among Tajiks and Turkmens in the North of the country, could be equal to crime, religious, as a rule.

In wider way question regarding how terms “illegal” or “criminal” economy are correct as applied to those provinces, where was none state control and where was peculiar legal vacuum, which is only aggravated in conditions of military resistance, is very rhetorical. Anyway, in that situation – especially during first stages of drug production, which are poppy cultivation itself, terms as “informal” or “shady” economy are more suitable. While illegal profit is a purpose and sense illegal economic activity, in case of most peasants, who cultivated opium poppy, it was just strategy of livelihood, which allowed them to survive.

As was noted above there is diversity among provinces. The role and impact of opium production on the livelihoods of landowners, sharecroppers, and migrant labor in Afghanistan is increasingly well understood. Irrespective of the cropping pattern, the river and its associated irrigation structures are the defining feature of the landscape, with a green ribbon of agricultural lands and dense settlements clustered along the river's length, which runs mainly northeast to southwest through Helmand before exiting into Nimroz

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<sup>55</sup> Opium Economy in Afganistan: An International Problem. UNODC Report. UN Pub. No. E. 03. XI. 6, 2003. – 226 P.

<sup>56</sup> Mansfield D. Alternative Development: The Modern Thrust of Supply – Side Policy// Bulletin on Narcotics. – 1999. – V.LI. - №1-2. <<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/bulletin/htm>



province. During the drought of the late 1990s, water supplies were very limited in the southern reaches of the river. The first is the geography and spatial distribution of Pushtun tribal identity that constitute an important aspect of social networks and power structures. The second is more one of economic class, with major differences in land ownership including a landlord class with substantial land holdings and a multitude of households with limited or no land who exist in sharecropping arrangements with the major land holders. The importance of the location of Helmand, as a border economy within Afghanistan and with a long history of smuggling and trade with Pakistan and Iran, must be recognized. Historically the major traders at the district centers were outsiders. Outside traders from Helmand, Kandahar, and Kabul largely controlled the export livestock trade and dealt directly with the Kuchis<sup>57</sup> in their key seasonal markets around Chaghcharan.

Opium poppy cultivation in Helmand dates back to well before the 1950s and the creation of the Helmand-Arghandab Valley Authority (HAVA). Traders used to come on camels from Pakistan and Iran to buy opium after the harvest. However, by 1992 with the fall of the Najibullah Government, the prices of inputs rose rapidly (these had been heavily subsidized), market networks began to deteriorate, maintenance of the irrigation system declined, and water shortages began to worsen. These provided considerable push factors to move back into substantial opium production as one of the only ways to access agricultural inputs. In addition, with the collapse of the Najibullah government in 1992 there was a sharp decline in the demand for guns on which a thriving smuggling operation from Pakistan had been based. For gun smugglers the opium market was the market of choice to move into. Since 1995 the opium poppy area in the province has fluctuated around 30,000 ha, with a drop in 2003 due to action by provincial authorities. It means that Helmand is firmly holding onto its position as the biggest opium cultivating and producing province in Afghanistan. Helmand has been included in the Southern region that also contains Uruzgan, Kandahar, Zabul, Ghazni, and Paktika. It was clear from Helmand that when the opium poppy market was open and legitimate, many were involved in opportunistic trading, even if on a very small scale. This included farmers and government servants. Larger traders in Helmand do keep stocks to respond to orders and demand given the seasonality of production. From all accounts, the sale of opium out of Helmand takes place throughout the year and as discussed below, happens episodically and quickly.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Kuchis (from the Pashto word *Koch* meaning "migration"), are tribes of Pashtun nomads primarily from the Ghilzai tribes. The population of nomads in Afghanistan was estimated at about 1-2 million people in 1979.

<sup>58</sup> Afghanistan's Drug Industry. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and World Bank

Various sources suggested that perhaps 40% of the annual purchase would be kept as stock for trading during the year before the next harvest, and also to be able to respond opportunistically to short-term price rises.

The Helmandi networks are clearly extensive and pervasive. Family networks link Nangarhar and Helmand, reflecting the Nangarhar origins of many in Helmand. Earlier, opium trade across provinces had operated apparently in a way not dissimilar from the hawala, and within the province on credit and reputation. It was reported that the trade has now shifted entirely to cash transactions only, across provinces and within provinces as well, indicative of the increased risks of trading. Personal networks seem to have closed in to trusted network members, with communication being largely undertaken through satellite phone connections. This shift may point to the existence of more local and regional markets than a national or "free" market.

The engagement of key provincial authorities in the opium economy is significant. When the opium trade was essentially open and legitimate, such authorities derived substantial personal incomes from it. With the shift from an open market to one that is illegal and vulnerable to confiscation, many of these authorities remain in position and reportedly have continued to engage in the opium economy, using their authority to gain greater control over the opium trade.

In Helmand, existing tribal divisions and their geographical basis already provide the strands of competition for power. Many small traders reported higher risks due to being targeted by the police, who confiscated opium reportedly to sell it on to the bigger traders. The control over distribution and trade seems to have become tighter in Helmand, including with respect to where trade can take place. Helmand has also come to occupy a pre-eminent position in opium trading systems, bolstered by its strategic location on the borders with Pakistan and Iran.<sup>59</sup>

### **1.6 Opium trading as shady business.**

Unlike opium cultivation and trade of opium crude, further opium trade and its derivatives was profitable business, which became integral part of Afghan and regional shady economy. And already in 1980s opium business in Afghanistan, unlike in Myanmar, had a high level of marketing and trade influence on production, including local level. At the local opium markets spot cash dominated. In the South of Afghanistan opium trade was more fragmentary and competitive, in the North and East opium markets, which were

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<sup>59</sup> Afghanistan's Drug Industry. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and World Bank

controlled by more inner circle of dealers, were less but they were bigger.<sup>60</sup> Bigger transit dealers were marketing regionally. Trans-border trading was easier because Pashtun tribe lives along the border in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Beluchi tribe lives along the border in Iran and Afghanistan. At the same time the most profits had middlemen, based in Pakistan. They usually had bases in frontier Peshawar and lived in Karachi or Lahore. During 1980s main traffic route from Afghanistan to Europe was Balkan route. Afghan opiates went through Pakistan and Iran to Turkey, where drugs were made in local laboratories, and then were delivered through the Balkans to Europe as crack. In Europe heroin was made from that crack.

While poppy cultivation was just an optimal strategy for livelihood, any form of drug trading was a pure drug business. However, in spite of important role of military conflict in creation of conditions for wide growth of drug production in Afghanistan, drug trading was, first of all, branch of shady economy, which was developing according to its own rules, which not necessarily coincide with war rules and corresponded with its needs. In Afghanistan drug business became one of “inner” sources of war, which can be defined as production, mobilization and distribution of economic resources. Since the beginning of 1980s mujahedeen became to use “opium” taxes for partial financing of arms purchase, often as exchange. At the same time, poppy cultivation itself generally was not the result of pressure of warlords, but more the initiative of farmers themselves, looking for more profitable crop during the war and local drug dealers. According to some data, mujahedeen profits gained on taxes from opium production and trading were about 20 million USD per year (10% of total financing) in 1980s.<sup>61</sup> However, drug business became one of the local resources of war; external support (arms, machines, ammunition, and money) was much bigger than inflow from the inner sources, including profits from drug business. Moreover, alternative valuable local resources were at warlords’ disposal, especially Jamiat-i-Islami, which was operating in the North. For instance, for Ahmad Shah Massoud, commander-in-chief of Jamiat-i-Islami, the main source of money was the income from controlled output of precious stones – emeralds, lazurites, etc., which were mining in mines in Panjshir, including labor of prisoners of war.

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<sup>60</sup> Opium Economy in Afganistan: An International Problem. UNODC Report. UN Pub. No. E. 03. XI. 6, 2003. – 226 P.

<sup>61</sup> Kellet N.A. External Involvement in Afganistan. Policy Group Report 2016. – Ottawa: Dep. of National Defence, directorate of Strategic Analysis. – 2000. <[http://www.dnd.ca/admpol/eng/doc/Afganistan/afg\\_ae.htm](http://www.dnd.ca/admpol/eng/doc/Afganistan/afg_ae.htm)

Basically, possibility of profits use from drug business or drug production as regular income by different opposition groups defined not only by its organizational or military needs, regions of deployment or operations, but also by other factors, including ideology. To all appearances, from all opposition groups a traditionalists group National Solidarity Movement of Afghanistan, leading by Sayyed Ahmad Gailani, was the most tightly bound with drug business. It was supported by local elite in the East (Nangarhar, Paktia and Laghman), it had different financial sources, including CIA's support, American foundations and NGOs, Western and Arab countries, profits from drug business, donations of murids<sup>62</sup> and wealthy people, etc.<sup>63</sup> However, possibility of use of profits from drug business by fundamentalist organizations can't be denied, might be supposed that traditionalists groups were closer to drug business than others. Some fundamentalist groups and warlords, especially of wahhabi persuasion, had been trying to ban and stop poppy cultivation on their territories. But it had bad influence on farmers and they had flown to Pakistan.

### **1.7 Reasons of growth of drug business and drug production after withdrawal of soviet troops.**

The completion of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was not a moment of rapturous joy for Afghans, although there were certain grounds for celebration. On the one hand, those who had battled Soviet forces since the December 1979 invasion felt overwhelming pride that a super power had been forced into what they saw as a retreat. But on the other hand, the suffering which the people of Afghanistan had been forced to endure during a decade of occupation was enormous, and even on the most optimistic of scenarios, the damage which had been inflicted on the country would take years to put right. In Afghanistan, the war produced a multilayered destructuring of politics, economy, and society, in ways, which remain massively apparent at the beginning of a new century. The effects of the war on the civilian population were horrendous. While certain areas were insulated for most of the 1980s from the worst effects – notably Kabul, with its security belt – the rural areas in which the bulk of the population lived were acutely vulnerable to the kinds of weapons, which the Soviet and Afghan Armies employed. As

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<sup>62</sup> Murid (Arabic: *مريد*) is a Sufi term meaning 'committed one'. It refers to a person who is committed to a teacher in the spiritual path of Sufism.

<sup>63</sup> Спольников В.Н. Афганистан. Исламская оппозиция: истоки и цели/ Отв. ред Ю.В. Ганковский. – М.: Наука, 1990. – 191 С.

was mentioned before, at the beginning of the 1990s over 6 million Afghan refugees were outside the country. While Pakistan and Iran performed remarkably in hosting the vast majority of these people, the environment of the refugees was inevitably one in which skills acquired through daily exposure to economic activity in Afghanistan were lost. Thus, the refugee exodus was destructive not only of the psychosocial wellness of those driven into exile, but also of the ability of a new generation of Afghans to function as farmers, herdsmen, or traders. Such disruption to human capital formation can fuel a cycle of conflict in war-torn societies, since it is often easier to train unskilled youth to fight than to farm. In addition to external refugees, countless Afghans were internally displaced during the war.<sup>64</sup>

Afghanistan suffered extensive physical damage during the 1980s which severely affected the operations of the Afghan economy. By the early 1990s, approximately 60 per cent of Afghan schools had no building. The road system was in a very poor condition, although buses continued to criss-cross the country. Given the significance of agriculture, however, it was deterioration of the agricultural sector that posed some of the greatest problems at the end of 1980s. Much of the damage was a product of deliberate attacks designed to deny the resistance access to food in sensitive areas. The damage caused to irrigation systems was to have one unintended but shattering consequence, namely the encouragement of drug production.<sup>65</sup>

During 1980s Afghanistan became one of the leading opium producers in the world. Since 1980 till 1990 opium production had grown from 200 tons to 1570 tons per year<sup>66</sup>, which means in almost 8 times. While for the last decade the opium production grew not more than in 10 times. Accordingly, Afghan part in world opium production had grown from 19% in 1980 to 42% in 1990.<sup>67</sup> However, in spite of on-going resistance to the PDPA government and Soviet presence and its economic consequences for the country, it had stimulated increase of drug production and drug trading. In 1989 Afghan opiates hadn't still exceeded 1/3 of world opium production. The ultimate "breakthrough" in growth of drug production, which made Afghanistan the leading supplier of opiates in the

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<sup>64</sup> Afghanistan wars. William Maley. Palgrave Macmillan. New York.2002. 340 pp

<sup>65</sup> Ibid

<sup>66</sup> Afganistan Opium Survey 2003. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Counter-narcotics Directorate of the Government of Afganistan. – UN Office for Drugs and Control and crime Prevention, Oct.2003

<sup>67</sup> Opium Economy in Afganistan: An International Problem. UNODC Report. UN Pub. No. E. 03. XI. 6, 2003. – 226 P.

world, occurred during the economic breakdown, political chaos and collapse of central government already after the Soviet troops withdrawal, after Soviet Union had refused the direct interference and soon collapsed itself. Since 1990 till 1994 the opium production in Afghanistan increased in more than 2 times: from 1570 tons to 3416 tons. There were some reasons for continuing growth of drug production in 1990s.

Critically, and in line with an increase of opium production in Pakistan, Afghanistan developed into a major supplier of opium, producing one-third of total global production by the mid-1980s. In the mid-1980s, "there was an arms pipeline going in, and a drug pipeline coming out of Afghanistan". By 1989 the seven major Mujahedeen groups were responsible for total production of over 800 metric tons of opium.

When Soviet troops withdrew in 1989, there was a weakening of the military pressure on the Mujahedeen, leading also to a reduction in external financial assistance to these groups. Combined with the devastation of the rural economy, this created strong incentives for cash producing activities, primarily the smuggling of all kinds of goods and the cultivation of opium poppy. After 1992 when the Mujahedeen took Kabul, the country fragmented into a series of sub-conflicts as local warlords fought each other or turned inward to consolidate their economic activities. By the mid-1990s, Afghanistan produced between 2,200 and 2,400 metric tons of opium per year.<sup>68</sup>

Firstly, with the Soviet troops withdrawal the military conflict didn't stop, but transformed into ethno-political resistance between former allies, who had fought against PDPA government and Soviets. In this case we can talk about series of mini-conflicts, united in one regional conflict system with blur borders. During the first part of 1990s, in the conditions of rise of ethno-political brigandage, need of armed groups in financial sources in actions against each other was still actual, and opium incomes were still stable financial source.

Secondly, after withdrawal of Soviet troops the American financial support of mujahedeen had been much more reduced. Accordingly, they needed their own financial sources, which stimulated further opium production and drug business. Although, USA together with USSR became the official guarantors of Geneva Accord of 1988, the American interest to Afghanistan had much more dropped. Of course, American support to mujahedeen didn't disappear at all after 1989, but it was almost double reduced, so in 1991

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<sup>68</sup> Afghanistan's Drug Industry. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and World Bank

it was only 200 million USD.<sup>69</sup> At the same time for 9 years and three month of Soviet presence it was 427 million USD per year. American support to Pakistan was reduced as well.

Thirdly, internal clashes had become more intensive, and it wasn't conducive for Afghan economy. In these conditions opium production was one of few stable incomes for farmers. The system and infrastructure were already set and functioning. In the beginning of 1990s thousands of Afghans came back to the country. In the conditions of agricultural decadence poppy cultivation was becoming one of few strategic livelihoods. Returning refugees multiplied the number of hired workers, and promoted opium production to the other Afghan provinces, bringing with you needed skills.

Fourthly, despite that during the PDPA government part of the territory was controlled by the Islamic opposition, central authorities was fighting against drugs on their territory. In Masar-i-Sharif, where in 1970s considerable number of opium was produced, opium production dropped in following decades. It was consequence of strict central authorities' control and lack of straight trafficking routes to Pakistan. On the contrary, with the collapse of USSR new trafficking routes became available. There were routes through the former Soviet Middle-Asian countries and they became additional stimulus for drug business in Afghanistan. As developing, this route through Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan became part of trans-regional trade system with the center in Afghanistan. The development of this system reached its culmination by the end of 20<sup>th</sup> century.

### **1.8 The rise and fall of the Rabbani government, Civil War in Afghanistan 1992-1996.**

The period of 1992-1996 is one of the more misunderstood in modern history of Afghanistan. It is all too frequently depicted as a period of unmitigated despair during which undisciplined "warlords" seemingly determined to establish that they were even less appetizing than the communist regime, battered each other for no obvious purpose at hideous cost to the civilian population. The 1992 to 1996 phase of the Civil war in Afghanistan began with the capture of Kabul by the Mujahedeen groups, and involved different factions of the Mujahedeen turning on one another until finally in 1996 the Taliban captured Kabul. In more recent times, this has been developed into an argument that post-Taliban Afghanistan runs a grave risk of encountering a similar face, since some

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<sup>69</sup> Kellet N.A. External Involvement in Afganistan. Policy Group Report 2016. – Ottawa: Dep. of National Defence, directorate of Strategic Analysis. – 2000.<[http://www.dnd.ca/admpol/eng/doc/Afganistan/afg\\_ae.htm](http://www.dnd.ca/admpol/eng/doc/Afganistan/afg_ae.htm)

of the personalities are the same. The turmoil after the collapse of the communist regime was fundamentally rooted in the collapse of the state, in the exposure of Afghanistan's domestic politics to external manipulation, and in the rationality of the spoiler. In the aftermath of the communist regime, the need for a functioning political system was considerable. The task of reconstruction was enormous, and the end of communist power had triggered the largest and fastest spontaneous repatriation of refugees in modern history. By the end of 1992, fully 1.4 million refugee had returned to Afghanistan since the beginning of the year. Yet the search for workable political institutions remained in its infancy, and one of the reasons was that the new Afghan political elite were severely divided.<sup>70</sup>

The first attempt at an elite settlement came in the Peshawar Accord of April 1992, which provided for the 'structure and process for the provisional period of the Islamic State of Afghanistan'.<sup>71</sup> It was a very brief text of only 12 paragraphs. According to this document Mujaddedi would for two months head a 51-person body (Shura-i Intiqali) to 'take over power from the present rulers of Kabul', and would serve as President. After this Rabbani was to take over the presidency, and serve as President and Head of the Shura-i Qiyadi (Leadership Council) for a further four months.<sup>72</sup>

The attempt to ground political power in an elite settlement failed for three reasons. The first was that the level of distrust within the elite was too high, especially between Hekmatyar and Massoud. Hekmatyar refused to sign the Peshawar Accord and soon it became inappropriate. He argued that the position of Prime Minister reserved for his party should not be subordinated to that of the President, and that the position of Defense Minister (to which Massoud had been appointed by Mujaddedi) should fall under the control of the Prime Minister. He also objected to the inclusion in the coalition of General Dostum, the leader of the Uzbek militias of the North, previously associated with the communists. He conveniently overlooked in this regard his own opportunistic alliance with Najibbulah's former Khali communist ministers, Shahnawaz Tanai and Aslam Watanjar.<sup>73</sup>

In August 1992 Hekmatyar launched a barrage of rockets against Kabul from his bases South and East of the city that killed over a thousand civilians. Although Hekmatyar insisted that only Islamic Jihad Council areas were targeted, the rockets mostly fell over the houses of the innocent civilians of Kabul. The new government introduced new strict

<sup>70</sup> Afghanistan wars. William Maley. Palgrave Macmillan. New York.2002. 340 pp

<sup>71</sup> Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan, New York: United Nations, A/47/656, General Assembly, 1992

<sup>72</sup> Afghanistan wars. William Maley. Palgrave Macmillan. New York.2002. 340 pp

<sup>73</sup> Afghanistan. A modern history. A. Rasanayagam. I.B. Tauris 2005. 311 p



laws which were thoroughly Islamic. Strict punishments according to Islamic law were very new to the people of Kabul who were already suffering from Hezb-i-Islami rocket attacks. These attacks destroyed half the city, took some 25, 000 civilian lives, and caused tens of thousands of Kabulis to seek safety in Pakistan or in the North.<sup>74</sup>

In June 1992, as scheduled, Burhanuddin Rabbani became president of Afghanistan, while Hekmatyar continued to bombard Kabul with rockets. After Rabbani's appointment, the whole control of the government went into Jamiat-i-Islami hands. In Burhanuddin Rabbani, Tajiks ruled Afghanistan for only the second time since the creation of the modern state of Afghanistan in 1898, the first being a brief seizure of power in the 1920s.

The once powerful alliance between the Uzbek General Abdul Rashid Dostum and Massoud was beginning to crack as the Uzbeks did not gain enough power under the new leadership. Different militia factions were fighting over control of different areas all over the country. Kandahar was filled with three different local Pashtun commanders Amir Lalai, Gul Agha Sherzai and Mullah Naqib Ullah who engaged in an extremely violent struggle for power. The bullet riddled city came to be a centre of lawlessness, crime and atrocities fuelled by complex Pashtun tribal rivalries'.

Just like the other parts of the country, serious fighting also broke out between the Saudi-backed Pashtun Wahhabi Ittehad-i-Islami party and the Iran-backed Shi'a Hezb-i-Wahdat party in Kabul. Both groups engaged in abducting Hazara<sup>75</sup> and Pashtun civilians. Hundreds were killed, and as many as 1,000 detained and tortured before a cease-fire finally took hold in June. Continuing tension between ethnic groups erupted in other violent confrontations throughout the remainder of the year. The government, for several reasons, but primarily due to Sectarian loyalties backed Sayyaf. Pashtun militia operated in western sectors of Kabul where most Hazaras lived.

In the month of August alone, a bombardment of artillery shells, rockets and fragmentation bombs killed over 2,000 people in Kabul, most of them civilians. Then in November, in a very effective move, Hekmatyar's forces, together with guerrillas from some of the Arab groups, barricaded a power station in Sarobi, 30 miles east of Kabul,

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<sup>74</sup> Afghanistan. A modern history. A. Rasanayagam. I.B. Tauris 2005. 311 p

<sup>75</sup> The Hazara (Persian: هزاره) are a Persian-speaking people residing in the central region of Afghanistan (referred to as Hazarajat) and northwestern Pakistan. The Hazara are predominantly Shī'ī Muslims and are the third largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, composing 10 to 19% of the population. Hazaras can also be found in large numbers in neighboring Iran and Pakistan, primarily as refugees, and as diaspora around the world.

cutting electricity to the capital and shutting down the water supply, which is dependent on power. His forces and other Mujahedeen were also reported to have prevented food convoys from reaching the city.

On November 23, Minister of Food Sulaiman Yaarin reported that the city's food and fuel depots were empty. The government was now under heavy pressure.

On January 19, a short-lived cease-fire broke down when Hezb-i-Islami forces renewed rocket attacks on Kabul from their base in the south of the city. Civilians were the main victims in the fighting which killed some 1,000 before a peace accord was signed on March 8.

Under the March accord, brokered by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, Rabbani and Hekmatyar agreed to share power until elections could be held in late 1994. Hekmatyar was named Prime Minister. And even after he was named Prime Minister he did not take up his post but remained outside Kabul. In January 1994, in alliance with Dostum who had defected from the Kabul coalition, and Mujaddedi, who had been frustrated in his efforts to have his two-month interim presidency extended to two years, Hekmatyar unleashed the most ferocious artillery and rocket attacks that Kabul had ever experienced.<sup>76</sup>

The cease-fire broke down again on May 11, leaving more than 700 dead in bombing raids, street battles and rocket attacks in and around Kabul. The parties agreed to a new peace accord in Jalalabad on May 20 under which Massoud agreed to relinquish the post of Defense Minister. A council of commanders was to assume that office, as well as the office of Interior Minister, but by mid-November the power struggle remained unresolved.

Hekmatyar's objectives were to ensure that the Rabbani government did not consolidate its power by building a credible administration and expanding its territorial control, and that it did not acquire the capacity, with lavish international support, for the reconstruction of the country, and to dispense patronage, and thus attract the loyalty of the population. Hekmatyar succeeded only too well. In the process, he exacerbated the anarchic conditions that paved the way for the success of the Taliban, discrediting also the Islamist parties, most of all his own. By his failure to take Kabul, he also lost his own credibility in the eyes of his Pakistani sponsors as a vehicle for their regional ambitions of achieving 'strategic depth' by installing an amenable client government in Kabul.

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<sup>76</sup> Afghanistan. A modern history. A. Rasanayagam. I.B. Tauris 2005. 311 p

Hekmatyar was disliked and even hated by other mujahedeen, who alleged that his forces had killed more mujahedeen during the jihad than communists.<sup>77</sup>

The second problem for an elite settlement was the impact of external powers, which affected the identities of the participants in the settlement. Officials in Pakistan, the host of the talks which led to the Peshawar and Islamabad Accords, had long held the view that Afghan opinion should be articulated through political parties. Those groups which felt marginalized were more likely to seek foreign patrons than accept the dictates of a body which they had played no great role in assembling. This Dostum did. But the third, and the most critical, problem was the absence of a state. The fragmentation of Afghan Army meant a government could not even remotely hope to secure an immediate monopoly over the means of large-scale violence, although in the long run it was Massoud's aim as Defense Minister to establish such monopoly. The collapse of state instrumentalities meant that securing a ministerial position was no guarantee of institutional power. In an atmosphere of rampant distrust, prudence would dictate the adoption of the strategies to secure one's position. Much of the violence that smashed parts of Kabul reflected rationally self-interested decision making by leaders, parties and militias in a situation in which there was no state to provide an overarching guarantee of security. It also reflected the interest of some of these decision makers in preventing any such state from taking shape.<sup>78</sup>

Of course, that unclear period made a lot of Afghan people suffer. The Afghan constitution that had guaranteed the basic human rights to women was suspended, and these rights have not been re-instated again. Much of the fighting between these warring factions was waged in the cities, and it is estimated that thousands of unarmed civilian women were killed by surprise rocket attacks - on residential areas, on schools, hospitals and even on a wedding celebration. Armed soldiers walked into homes and demanded 'ownership' of the teenage girls. Should these young women refuse to go with the soldiers, they were often shot dead right there in front of their families.

An Amnesty International report tells how the dead body of such an abducted lass was found in a back street, days later, by her family. It tells of a father who killed his own daughter rather than have her be taken away by men with guns; it tells of a young girl who jumped to her death rather than be abducted and raped by these armed militia. Guards shot one man because he had allowed his daughter to attend school, and then the 15-year-old

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<sup>77</sup> Afghanistan. A modern history. A. Rasanayagam. I.B. Tauris 2005. 311 p

<sup>78</sup> Afghanistan wars. William Maley. Palgrave Macmillan. New York.2002. 340 pp

was gang-raped by her father's killers. Sometimes the guards sold the abducted young girls into prostitution in countries neighboring Afghanistan. Women, who fled Afghanistan during these years of the early nineties, often had to pay bribes to be allowed into Pakistan. Some of these refugees were beaten and abused by the foreign soldiers. Even in the refugee camps, women would find themselves under attack from the guards, or that they were forced to trade sexual favors in exchange for food and other necessities.<sup>79</sup>

Significant changes occurred in 1994 in how the war was conducted and who fought which side. The Taliban movement first emerged on the military scene in August 1994, with the stated goal of liberating Afghanistan from its present corrupt leadership of warlords and establish a pure Islamic society. By October 1994 the Taliban movement had attracted the support of Pakistan, which saw in the Taliban a way to secure trade routes to Central Asia and establish a government in Kabul friendly to its interests. Pakistani traders who had long sought a secure route to send their goods to Central Asia quickly became some of the Taliban's strongest financial backers. The Pakistanis also wished for a stable government to take hold in Afghanistan, regardless of ideology, in hopes that the 3 million Afghans who for 15 years had taken refuge in Pakistan would return to their homeland since the refugee population became increasingly viewed as a burden. In September 1995, the Taliban took control of Herat, thereby cutting off the land route connecting the Islamic State of Afghanistan with Iran. The Taliban's innovative use of mobile warfare appeared to indicate that Pakistan may have provided assistance or training for the capture of Herat. In June 1996 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who had resigned as prime minister in 1994 to launch a military offensive against forces loyal to Rabbani, again assumed the post, this time to help Rabbani's government fight the Taliban threat. Despite their efforts, Afghanistan's Taliban militia seized control of Kabul on September 27, 1996 soon after government forces abandoned the shattered capital. In its first action, the Islamic militant group hanged former President Najibullah and his brother from a tower. All key government installations appeared to be in Taliban's hands within hours, including the presidential palace and the ministries of defense, security and foreign affairs. Massoud was forced to retreat to the North. He began to obtain military assistance from Russia as well as Iran and the Northern Alliance was reconstituted in opposition to the Taliban.

Northern Alliance has been linked repeatedly to the opium trade, of course. In 1994 the New York Times reports that tens of thousands of Islamic radicals from around the

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<sup>79</sup> Women in Afghanistan 1992-1996 - Moira Richards

[http://www.suite101.com/article.cfm/women\\_abuse/80927/2](http://www.suite101.com/article.cfm/women_abuse/80927/2)

world have come to train in Afghanistan since the end of the Soviet-Afghan war, in order to bring the militant jihad struggle back to their home countries. There are dozens of training camps all over the country, with around 20 under control of warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar alone. Even though bin Laden is living in Sudan at this time and has moved some training camps there, he also keeps some camps and guesthouses open in Pakistan and Afghanistan until he moves back to Afghanistan take direct control of them in 1996. A civil war that has raged non-stop since the Soviets left and the growing importance of the opium crop made Afghanistan into “essentially a lawless country. There is no civil law, no government, no economy—only guns and drugs and anger.” Abdul Haq, a politically moderate warlord, says, “For us, Afghanistan is destroyed. It is turning to poison, and not only for us but for all others in the world. If you are a terrorist, you can have shelter here, no matter who you are. Day by day, there is the increase of drugs. Maybe one day [the US] will have to send hundreds of thousands of troops to deal with that. And if they step in, they will be stuck. We have a British grave in Afghanistan. We have a Soviet grave. And then we will have an American grave.”<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> Tim Weiner “Blowback From the Afghan Battlefield,” New York Times, 13 March 1994

## Chapter 2

### **Drug business and conflict in Afghanistan under the Taliban regime.**

On the morning of 27 September 1996, the residents of Kabul awoke to a grisly spectacle. Two dead bodies were hanging from a traffic policeman pylon in downtown square. The dead men were Dr Najibullah and his younger brother. Just a few days earlier, during a meeting with UN Under Secretary-General Marrack Goulding, Najibullah had declined to leave Kabul. "He had no fear of the Taliban, he said; his only enemy was Ahmed Shah Masood". It was the worst, and the last, mistake of his life. Photographs of the spectacle were flashed around the world, and although the exact identify of the killers was never firmly established, it was universally interpreted as a manifestation of the Taliban character.<sup>81</sup>

In the beginning of 1990s Afghanistan wasn't any more zone of world powers' resistance, one of which – USSR - had collapsed, and the other – USA – lost its interest. At the same time Afghanistan had lost its strategic importance as "buffer state". Before that Afghanistan was peculiar transit zone with basically opened borders, which were crossed by trade routes, which were playing role of transit corridors for its regional shady economy. However, Afghanistan didn't lose its strategic importance in the region. The world powers were replaced by regional actors; first of all Pakistan and Iran, keeping solid connections with different armed Afghan groups. Lasting instability and growth of ethno-political resistance in Afghanistan couldn't be dangerous for regional stability in general and safety of formatting of young Middle-Asian republics, which appeared after the collapse of USSR, forcing them to activate all the contacts with their ethnic groups in the North of Afghanistan.

Expanding from its base in the South with its headquarters in Kandahar, the Taliban eventually conquered most of the country. Afghanistan under the Taliban became strongly integrated into regional trading and smuggling networks, providing the new regime with an important source of revenue. These networks grew in strength and "involved a web of commercial players with far better international contacts and market access than the Taliban themselves". In the first years of the Taliban rule there was an increase of opium poppy cultivation; in 1997/98 total production was 2,700 metric tons, a 43% increase over the previous year, with cultivation spreading to new areas. Production peaked in 1998/99 at

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<sup>81</sup> Afghanistan wars. William Maley. Palgrave Macmillan. New York.2002. 340 pp

4,500 metric tons, representing three-quarters of the world's supply.<sup>82</sup> The overall result was an economy further skewed toward illicit activities such as smuggling and opium poppy cultivation. The subsequent Taliban edict banning opium cultivation, the reasons for which remain debated, sharply reduced the country's overall output of opium to almost negligible levels, although cultivation increased in areas, most prominently the northeast, outside of the Taliban's control.

Appearance of the regional dimension of inner Afghan conflict at the first plan coincided with activation of regional shady economy. It became the main, but not only, base of "war economy" in Afghanistan. In the beginning of 1990s the continuing blurring and actual deeping of the ethno-political disunity gave the country a new impulse for the development of trans-border regional routes of smuggling. The significant number of Afghan refugees in the neighboring countries made it much easier. Regionalization of Afghan economy had reached its apogee. The western provinces with the center in Herat oriented themselves to the north-eastern parts of Iran with the center in Mashhad. Afghanistan imported cheap oil from Iran, and exported cheap labor. South provinces with the center in Kandahar were tightly bounded with Pakistani Quetta, eastern provinces with the center in Jalalabad - with Pakistani Pashawar, northern provinces with the center in Masar-i-Sharif were economically oriented to the Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. So, all the economic zones, except central Hazarajat, were oriented to the different neighboring states. At the same time they were keeping some level of autonomy and inner stability; one or few large towns were centers of such zones.

Control over the city meant control over the trading center, markets, from where mujahedeen received the most part of their income. While they couldn't establish control over the capital – Kabul, they could blockade it economically, creating in that way new flows of displaced persons, and organizing alternative markets nearby. The basics of regional shady economy, part of which were drug business and drug trafficking, had established in Afghanistan long before Taliban regime. The main basic of this shady economy was transit smuggling. The profits from the smuggling were much more significant than profits from drug business. Afghanistan, remaining almost uncontrolled during the most part of 1990s, could have kept fragments of shipping infrastructure, connecting Iran, Pakistan and Middle Asia, became singular center of regional shady

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<sup>82</sup> Afganistan Opium Survey 2003. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Counter-narcotics Directorate of the Government of Afganistan. – UN Office for Drugs and Control and crime Prevention, Oct.2003

economic system. The smuggling routes went through Iran (mainly through Bandar-e Abbas harbor) and then to Pakistan through Afghanistan. In 1990s wild outburst of warlords damaged trade a lot, blocked Pakistani access to Middle Asia and prevented creation of even minimal security. In this conditions Pakistani authorities, corporations of Afghan and Pakistani traders, and also ultraconservative Afghan and Pakistani leaders of madrassa, preaching Deobandi, created Taliban movement.

The Taliban were a military force. They were not simply an example of villagers coming to the cities. Their values were not the values of the village as interpreted by refugee camp dwellers or madrassa students who typically had not known normal village life. They were a pathogenic force, whose view of the world conspicuously omitted the pragmatic moderation which historically had muted the application of tribal and religious codes in Afghan society. Taliban were overwhelmingly Sunni Pashtu group, and many of them were fiercely hostile to Afghanistan's ethnic and Shiite minorities.<sup>83</sup> "Beware of the beggar who becomes a king" runs a well-known Afghan proverb. The undisputed leader of the Taliban, from its inception to its collapse, was Mulla Muhammd Omar. He had little mass charismatic appeal, and was a poor speaker, but was respected to his piety by the top leadership of the movement. He had lost an eye as a combatant during the war against the Soviets, and plainly found his injury mortifying: he did not allow himself to be photographed, and in the meeting with the senior visitor kept twisting his head to hide his disfigurement. Mulla Omar, with the carefully managed acclamation of ulema, took the title of Amir al-Momineen (Commander of the Faithful), and to legitimate his authority, appeared in the public with one of Afghanistan's most sacred treasures, the Clock of the Prophet Muhammad.<sup>84</sup> Following the nomenclature the Taliban renamed their country into "The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan". The deployment of this title was symbolically significant: it marked a claim to absolute authority, and a decisive repudiation of power sharing, or indeed of politics.

Within the Taliban, there were a number of distinct groups. The leaders were not young students, but like Omar himself had typically been combatants in mujahedeen parties, most commonly the Harakat-e-Inqilab-Islami of Maulana Mohammedi, who was strongly supported the Taliban, and Hizbi-i-Islami of Khalis. The madrassa students who gave the movement its name, on the other hand, were often too young to have fought against USSR. Many were orphans from refugee camps who had been recruited into

<sup>83</sup> Afghanistan wars. William Maley. Palgrave Macmillan. New York.2002. 340 pp

<sup>84</sup> "Introduction: Interpreting the Taliban" in William Maley (ed.), *Fundamentalism reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban*, London: Hurst & Co., 1998



madrassas and had lacked any normal family or home life. The movement also contained Khalqis who had joined the Taliban because of ethnic solidarity. In addition, as the Taliban continued to spread through the country, a large number of people prudentially switched to their side, providing them with an ostensibly large, but in fact rather fragile support base. Finally, the Taliban attracted some moderate Pashtuns who clung to the hope that the Taliban would pave the way for the return of Zahir Shah. Moderate of this ilk were hardly ISI's cup of tea, given their attachments to the Afghan regime which had been at odds with Pakistan over Pashtunistan, but they did perform the useful function of reassuring the Americans there were Taliban supporters with whom they could deal.<sup>85</sup>

The first big operation of the Taliban in Afghanistan was release of Pakistani trading escort, blocked by one of Afghan armed groups on its way to Turkmenistan in October 1994.<sup>86</sup> Consolidation of the Taliban in Afghanistan suited not only economically but also politically the interests of main regional actor – Pakistan, which looked at the Taliban, as a way to restore Pashtun authority in Afghanistan and reduce Pashtun problem in Pakistan itself.

Consolidation of the Taliban wasn't opposed by USA as well, and suited them at some point, especially in context of American economic interests in the region. One of the projects was a gas pipeline construction through the territory of western Afghanistan for transmitting gas from Tajikistan to Pakistan with American, Saudi and Japanese participation. To realize this project an international consortium "Sentgas" was organized in October 1997. The cost of the project was about 3.5 billion USD.

After Kabul seizure in 1996 majority of Hakmatyar's troops were beaten and joined Taliban, Hakmatyar escaped to Iran. In 1998 the Taliban controlled the majority of Afghanistan (about 90%), including the main transport routes, cities, airports and customs. Acting in a very hard manner the Taliban could noticeably have limited action of warlords on their controlled territory and disarmed some groups of mujahedeen, at the same time they restore order in towns and on roads. Improvement of security promoted lowering of risk and transportation expenses for traders and strengthened position of Afghanistan as a center of regional shady economy.

As a whole, in 1990s all the borders between shady and rest of economy had been blurred. The same routes were used for transportation of legal (foodstuff) and illegal (drugs, weapons) goods. Security provided by the Taliban promoted not only shady

<sup>85</sup> Afghanistan wars. William Maley. Palgrave Macmillan. New York.2002. 340 pp

<sup>86</sup> Rocha R. The Colombian Economy After 25 Years of Narcotrafficking. Executive Summary of the Report by UNDCCP, Universidad del Rosario <<http://www.unodc.org/colombia/en/htm>

economy but economy and trade in general on controlled territory. Reconstruction of local markets and inner barter had lead to gradual leveling of prices in different provinces, which was favorable for common inner market – at least to the South form Hindukush. US Dollar rate of exchange dropped for more than a half on controlled territories.<sup>87</sup> Such politics had responded to the interests of Afghan-Pakistani corporations of smugglers and created conditions for further opium production and agriculture in general.

At the end of 1990s there was an opium boom on the Taliban territories. In the record 1999 97% of all Afghan opium was cultivated and 79% of world opium was produced there. However in 2000 this share reduced, but still it was 70% of all world opium, the rest fell on Myanmar and Laos. About 80% of heroin, which was for sale in Europe at the end of 1990, was produced from Afghan opium. Moreover, Afghanistan was the main supplier of opium, morphine and heroin for India, Middle Asia, some countries of Arabian Peninsula and Eastern Africa. At the same time significant part of Afghan opium remained in the countries of Middle East – Pakistan, Iran, where besides traditional opium smoking abruptly increased use of heroin. Total number of heroin users in those countries was gradually approaching the number of users in Western Europe, which were 1.5 million people at the beginning of 2000s.<sup>88</sup>

The abruptly growth of opium production and export in Afghanistan at the end of 1990s, especially in compare with the main competitor – Myanmar, could be tracked in UNODC documents, as well as in the documents of Drug Enforcement Administration. According to UNODC, Myanmar was interior to Afghanistan in opium production during all 1990s, however at the end of decade gap between them enlarged. In 1998 Afghanistan produced in two times more opium than Myanmar, and in record 1999 – in 5.2 times more, in 2000 – in 3 times more.<sup>89</sup> At the end of 20<sup>th</sup> century the greatest harvest of opium was gathered in Helmand and Nangarhar, which were controlled by the Taliban, it was corresponded to  $\frac{3}{4}$  of total opium crops in Afghanistan. At the same time, area of poppy cultivation was enlarged on the territory, controlled by the Northern Alliance. But Badakshan, controlled by the Taliban, remained the traditional place of opium production. In the North other drugs, based on cannabis, were becoming popular, for instance, drugs,

<sup>87</sup> Афганистан: справочник/ Отв. ред. А.В. Давыдов. – М.: ИВ РАН, 2000. – 256 С.

<sup>88</sup> Opium Economy in Afganistan: An International Problem. UNODC Report. UN Pub. No. E. 03. XI. 6, 2003. – 226 P.

<sup>89</sup> Afganistan Opium Survey 2003. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Counter-narcotics Directorate of the Government of Afganistan. – UN Office for Drugs and Control and crime Prevention, Oct.2003

and based on hempen pitch with addition of opium. In general, poppy spreading was concentrated in few Afghan provinces - first of all in Helmand and Nangarhar, and then in Kandahar, Badakshan and Urozgan.<sup>90</sup> At the end of 1990s from 30% to 50% of Afghan population participated in opium production and opium trade.<sup>91</sup> According to UN, at the end of 1990s there were almost 15 thousand opium traders in the country. However, profits of Afghan farmers were considerably small in compare with people who were dealing with production process; it most probably was made in Northern provinces of Pakistan, which were not controlled by Pakistani government. Making process was carried out under supervision of influential clans, such as clan Afridi.

The remaining income is divided between different actors involved in the trading of opium from the farm gate to Afghanistan's borders. While the farm-gate buyers are the most numerous among these actors, they are believed to receive a relatively small part of domestic trade revenue (i.e. drug export value minus farm gate value), owing to intense competition that limits profit margins. Likewise, the share of domestic trade revenue accruing to shop owners in the regional opium bazaars and to clandestine laboratories appears relatively small. The main part of domestic trade revenue is believed to accrue to a limited number of bulk buyers and large-scale specialist traders who buy opium throughout the year and organize shipping to border areas or directly abroad, and incur large risks. To reduce these risks, a significant part of their revenue is spent on "security providers", including warlords' militias. Contrary to the Colombian drug traffickers, these bulk buyers and specialist traders do not appear to be organized in cartels.<sup>92</sup>

**Farmers:** At the base of the pyramid are the opium poppy farmers themselves. A great deal of excellent work has focused on the factors contributing to decisions by farmers to cultivate opium poppy as well as the specific dynamics of the Afghan rural economy. While these issues largely fall outside the scope of this assessment, several specific points are worth recording. First, there is still relatively free entry at the cultivation stage. Farmers who have access to land, credit, and seed (the latter two typically provided by the trafficking organizations themselves) are able to farm cultivate opium poppy. Second, the process of poppy eradication has imposed additional financial burdens on farmers in some

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<sup>90</sup> Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Counter-narcotics Directorate of the Government of Afghanistan. – UN Office for Drugs and Control and crime Prevention, Oct.2003

<sup>91</sup> Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict/ International crisis Group (ICG) Asia Report №25

<sup>92</sup> Afghanistan's Drug Industry. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and World Bank

areas. That is, payment must be provided to local authorities, usually the police or the local commander, to avoid eradication.

**Small-scale traders:** Also at the base of the pyramid are small-scale traders. These traders generally live within the rural communities and know the opium poppy farmers in their areas well. Farmers often sell directly to such small-scale traders, both because they know them and have developed a relationship of trust over a period of time, and also for the sake of convenience, as it may be difficult for farmers to travel to the village to sell directly to village traders. Moreover, farmers may, for example, fear that they would have to pay off the local police during such a journey. The market at this, the lowest level, is relatively open, and a farmer generally may choose the small-scale trader to whom he sells. Such small-scale traders are normally local shopkeepers or general traders who may exchange goods such as sugar, flour, or food directly for opium.

**Local traders:** Generally situated in villages, local opium traders buy up the produce of a number of small-scale traders or farmers. The market at this level also remains relatively open, with there being some choice with respect to who small-scale traders can sell their produce to, although this is generally based on existing networks and connections.

Depending on the area, such local traders may have to provide payments to the local police, administration officials, or local commander. Interviews suggest, however, that the relationship between local traders and those they sell to is now much more organized and operates with a greater degree of secrecy than in the past.

**Middle-level traders:** These traders buy up opium from local traders. The market at this level remains relatively fluid, with middle-level traders still having some degree of choice on who they sell to at the next level. Nevertheless, several informants reported that levels of secrecy at this level are considerably higher now, and that there are now restrictions on who can enter the market. Middle-level traders therefore operate on the edge of the criminal underworld. The individuals and operations above this point in the pyramid are highly secretive, and entry is very restricted for new players without the necessary resources or connections.

**Traffickers:** Traffickers buy opium from middle-level traders and sell it to connections on the other side of the border. These individuals are reported to be highly organized and comparatively wealthy. Their link to the next level is on the basis of key contacts and connections. Interviews repeatedly confirmed that new operators are excluded from entering at this level, and that the relationship between traffickers and the "trafficking elite" is characterized by a high degree of secrecy and "discipline". In some cases,

traffickers at this level may have connections to two or three of the key traffickers, but in the vast majority of cases they owe their allegiance to a single individual. There may, however, be some cooperation between such traffickers, particularly where they owe their allegiance to the same member of the "trafficking elite". Traffickers are engaged in the movement of the drugs themselves and also pay off local commanders and police chiefs as required.<sup>93</sup>

**Key traffickers:** The apex of the operational component of the pyramid is the "trafficking elite". This constitutes a limited number of players country-wide. The individuals at this level have important political connections which ensure that their operations are not compromised and for which they provide payments. These individuals are extremely wealthy and sometimes play key roles in their communities or political environment. For this reason, they do not "dirty their hands" with the actual process of trafficking. They do appear in most cases to play a critical role in regulating supply, in two ways. The first is supervision of the laboratories and the processed heroin that is produced at them. This includes control over the trafficking of precursor chemicals, although the actual work is done by the traffickers described above. The second is regulating the market through the stock they hold, and when it is released for trafficking. It is estimated that as many as 20-30 traffickers may be clustered around each of the key traffickers.<sup>94</sup>

In the background of armed confrontation between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance opium business remained place of peaceful competition. Moreover, ability of the Taliban to provide relative security on the controlled territories made opium boom very possible. Regardless of widespread opinion that the Taliban had great profits from drug business, it wasn't so profitable for them. The profit of the Taliban was 10% tax on poppy, as agricultural crop, collected directly from farmers, and also 20% tax on opium trade and its derivatives. So the profit of the Taliban wasn't more than 45 million USD even in record 1999.<sup>95</sup> According to UN, at the beginning of 2002-2003, when opium capacity was commensurable with 1999, annual world turnover of Afghan opiates was almost 30 billion USD.<sup>96</sup> Half million people were equipped in opium trade in a chain from Afghanistan to Europe.

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<sup>93</sup> Afghanistan's Drug Industry. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and World Bank

<sup>94</sup> Ibid

<sup>95</sup> Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict/ International crisis Group (ICG) Asia Report №25

<sup>96</sup> Афганистан: обзор по опию в 2003 г. Резюме доклада УНП ООН и Управления по борьбе с наркотиками правительства Афганистана – М: УНП ООН, 2003

In general, during 1990s - beginning of 2000 trade of Afghan opium was distinguished by small level of vertical integration, and the main profits accumulated beyond the bounds of not only Afghanistan, but the whole region. In this background, attempts of the Taliban to limit opium production didn't look so sudden. The Taliban leaders made corresponding declarations even in 1996. In August 1999 Mulla Omar issued an edict about reducing areas of poppy cultivation on 1/3, and in 2000 – edict about full ban on poppy cultivation as on “forbidden by Allah” activity. As shown by 2000-2001 season success of the ban was practically full on the Taliban territories. After two decades of continuous growth of poppy crops, there was a reduction on 91%, according to UN. In Helmand, where in 2000 more than a half of all poppy crops in the country were cultivated, in 2001 cultivation was absolutely stopped. As the result of the ban opium and morphine supply was essentially reduced in Western Asia, but heroin supply was almost unchangeable. But if the Taliban, in view of religious and strategic ideas, could manage without drug profits, the average population of opium provinces suffered from serious consequences. The most visible from them was fast growth of debts, because people sold out all their opium stocks. Nevertheless, in spite of opium ban, in 2001 Afghanistan remained in the row of leading opiates suppliers in the world. Partly it was connected with poppy cultivation on the territories controlled by the Northern Alliance. In 2001 on these territories was sowed 1600 ha of opium poppy, which resulted in 80% of Afghan opium.<sup>97</sup> The other reason for unceasing flow of Afghan drugs could be considerable opium stocks in the country. According to some data, in some years up to 60% of all produced opium was stored within the country.<sup>98</sup> On the other hand, according to UN, by July 2000 these stocks were not more than 220 tons of opium. Together with enduring drought, considerable stocks of opium poppy in the conditions of overstocking of world opium market could be the reason of opium ban in Afghanistan. Actually, this ban had lead to the jump of opium prices from 30 USD up to 300 USD per kilo in May 2001. However, this situation didn't last, after the 9/11 prices for Afghan opium dropped to 180 USD per kilo, and by the end of September - to 90 USD per kilo.<sup>99</sup>

The day before opium ban Afghanistan supplied 70% of all world opium, and a whole series of countries were supplied with exceptionally Afghan opium. In these

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<sup>97</sup> International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. – US Dep. of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Efforts, 2002-2004

<sup>98</sup> Perl P. F. Taliban and the Drug Trade. Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, 2001

<sup>99</sup> Афганистан: обзор по опию в 2003 г. Резюме доклада УНП ООН и Управления по борьбе с наркотиками правительства Афганистана – М: УНП ООН, 2003

conditions sudden raucous cessation of opium production in Afghanistan must have had very serious consequences connected with interest on the world drug mafia, threaten to blow up heroin markets in Europe and other regions, especially if ban was lasted.<sup>100</sup> However, events of 9/11 turned American war machine to Afghanistan against the Taliban regime, which break-up meant collapse of strict control over the opium production in the country.

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<sup>100</sup> Opium Economy in Afganistan: An International Problem. UNODC Report. UN Pub. No. E. 03. XI. 6, 2003. – 226 P.

### Chapter 3

#### **The rise of illicit drug business at the stage of post-conflict peace-building in post-Taliban Afghanistan.**

The people of Afghanistan have suffered from a quarter-century of civil war and external military intervention. The devastation wrought by the conflict has resulted in the collapse of physical, economic, and government infrastructure across the country, a process which is only now being slowly reversed. Afghanistan was very poor before it was engulfed in persistent conflict, but the conflict made the circumstances of the country's people much worse. Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world, with indicators like life expectancy (46 years) and under-five mortality (257 deaths per 1,000 live births) placing the country's citizens at the lowest levels of global human security and development.<sup>101</sup>

Throughout the protracted period during which Afghanistan was at war, both with itself and with outside invaders, the political economy of pursuing and sustaining conflicts has been closely intertwined with illicit activities. Indeed, the link between war and illicit activities became progressively stronger over the long conflict in the country. Both a cause and a consequence of this is that a weak central state in Kabul has been unable to govern the country's "borderlands", which given their geographical position and their integration into regional trading and smuggling networks, have often had stronger links to surrounding states - Pakistan in the South and East, Iran in the west, and Central Asia in the North and North-East - than to the occupants of the seat of government in Kabul. Unable to effectively control the geographical territory of the country, the Afghan state has been propped up by external powers, with limited interaction between the state apparatus and the majority of citizens.<sup>102</sup> As Barnett Rubin noted: "Ending war in Afghanistan might transform the criminalized war economy into an even faster-expanding criminalized peace economy. Whoever rules Afghanistan, the incentives for misgovernment are nearly irresistible."<sup>103</sup>

US military operation in Afghanistan, which started in October 2001 and was supported by North Alliance, and Russian military forces, led to the fall of Taliban already

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<sup>101</sup> Human Development Report 2005: International Cooperation at a Crossroads - Aid, Trade and Security in an Unequal World. New York: UNDP.

<sup>102</sup> Goodhand, Jonathan. "Frontiers and Wars: the Opium Economy in Afghanistan". *Journal of Agrarian Change*, Vol.5, № 2, 2005

<sup>103</sup> Rubin B.R. *The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan*// *World Development*. – 2000. – V.28. No.10



by the end of 2001. But with the fall of authoritarian, fundamentalist regime the situation in the sphere of drug control worsened rapidly, and opium production resumed. During its regime Taliban could have obtained the strict observance of the opium ban, using very barbarian methods though. However these tasks were beyond powers of Hamed Karzai's government, in spite of western help and support of International Security Assistance Force. The UN Security Council on 20 December adopted Resolution 1386, which authorized the establishment of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), with a 'Chapter VII' enforcement mandate. It was not a UN Peacekeeping force designed to stabilize a cease-fire through interposition, but – as its title suggested – a security assistance force, to secure Kabul and assist the process of developing a unified army. Its expenses were to be met by the participating member states. The lead in this respect was taken by the United Kingdom, with Major-General John McColl as ISAF Force Commander.<sup>104</sup>

We cannot say that with the fall of the Taliban the conflict in Afghanistan has become outdated. Karzai's Government had controlled Kabul, but warlords had all the power outside the capital. Of course, situation was better than during the first half of 1990s, but decentralization and fragmentation of military and political potential and unwillingness of regional leaders and warlords to share power with pro-western central government were more than clear.

Retaining American and foreign military presence in the country, supported by constant threat of resuming American 'pointed bombings', which were operated on the plea of war on terrorism, had dual meaning. It was the factor of control of local armed groups and basic guarantee of security of central government, but at the same time it provoked military operations from their side. However, owing to very limited foreign military presence, resistance to foreign troops was also limited at the beginning of 2000s. So, although military resistance in post-Taliban Afghanistan didn't stop, its intensity reduced, and direction changed. Further fragmentation of violence and its return to its previous traditional place at some point was very clear. As the result organized crime began to bloom in Afghanistan with new forces.

Leading participants in the Afghan peace and democratization process have warned of the threat that organized crime poses to the state formation in Afghanistan. The former Minister of the Interior, Ahmad Ali Jalali, warned that his country was turning into

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<sup>104</sup> Afghanistan wars. William Maley. Palgrave Macmillan. New York.2002. 340 pp

a "narco-state."<sup>105</sup> The UN Secretary-General has expressed his concern to both to the General Assembly and the Security Council about the growth of narcotics trafficking and organized crime in Afghanistan and its ability to subvert the peaceful transition to a viable democracy, the economic benefits of which should be shared by all citizens.<sup>106</sup>

Organized crime in any society must rely on at least a basic agreement as to what is understood by the term. However, the diversity of criminal actors and organizations across the globe - and indeed within single regions or countries - has made consensus as to the definition of "organized crime" difficult to achieve. "Organized crime consists of organizations that have durability, hierarchy and involvement in a multiplicity of criminal activities"<sup>107</sup>.

The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime did not lead to full consensus on a definition of organized crime. An agreement was, however, reached on what constitutes an "organized crime group, which is defined in the Convention as a "structured group of three or more persons existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit" (United Nations Convention against Transnational Crime, Article 2a).

In reality, different organized crime groups, both in Afghanistan and elsewhere, can generally be represented along a spectrum: from highly organized, hierarchical mafia-type groups which dominate some markets to more loosely organized networks or gangs which are active in others. Such groups, in the words of a recent study of organized crime, seek to "govern the underworld". They would constitute a criminal cartel if, acting together or when a limited number of groups become dominant; they are able to regulate prices or outputs in any criminal market. In contrast, more loosely organized networks of criminal operators may constitute an organized crime group under a broad definition and indeed may acquire high levels of illicit profits, but do not seek extensive control over an illicit market or segment of it. Importantly, organized crime is willing to offer protection both to legal (but poorly protected by the state) and illegal transactions. For these reasons, organized crime is often present where state institutions are unable or unwilling to provide efficient protection to legal transactions, be this more generally or in specific markets or

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<sup>105</sup> Press Conference Comments in Kabul. May 13, 2005.

<<http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/338/Kabul.shtml>

<sup>106</sup> Report of the Secretary-General. The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for Peace and Security. August 12, 2005. A/60/224-S/2005/25

<sup>107</sup> Reuter, Peter. *Disorganised Crime: Illegal Markets and the Mafia*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983

localities. In short, "the more confused the legal framework of a country, the more incompetent the police, the more inefficient the courts, the more the mafia will thrive". As a consequence, the more that protection of illegal transactions is efficiently provided, the more scope there is for illegal markets to grow.<sup>108</sup>

Post-conflict societies are particularly vulnerable to the growth of organized crime. The decline of authoritarian rule or the ending of conflict often leads to a transition to democratic governance and in many cases steps toward the establishment of market economies. This may frequently take place in the context of a legislative void, lack of transparency, lack of capacity in key government institutions, and, as a result, increased vulnerability to criminal and corrupt practices. Historical and institutional factors, such as continuing political tensions, the existence of patronage networks, non-applicability of the rule of law, and fragile civil society complicate the path to democracy and provide fertile grounds for organized criminal activities. Organized crime groups, warlords, terrorists, opponents, and even members of the government (or a combination of these) may take advantage of institutional and legal weaknesses and engage in illegal activities, impeding the establishment of democratic norms and principles.

The Bonn Agreement, signed on December 5, 2001, provided a roadmap for political transition in Afghanistan, culminating in the September 2005 Parliamentary elections. Much has been achieved in this period, including the building of basic state functions and the establishment of rudimentary controls by the centralized state, with the Karzai's Government being able to extend its authority to most areas of the country and to curtail the influence of prominent warlords. The assertion that drug trafficking is in the hands of warlords and commanders, while containing some elements of truth, no longer reflects the greater complexity of the situation. Recent assessments of drug trafficking in Afghanistan have noted some important changes, including that "there are disturbing signs that the opium industry is beginning to move toward greater vertical integration, with increased involvement by organized crime". However, there has been no systematic study of the evolution of organized crime and its involvement in drug trafficking in recent years.<sup>109</sup>

The year 2003 is cited as a critical period in the transformation of organized criminal activity in Afghanistan from essentially a relatively fragmented and open market to one where a limited number of operators have begun to dominate. A key factor in this

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<sup>108</sup> Shaw, Mark. *Drug Trafficking and the Development of Organized Crime in Post-Taliban Afghanistan*.

*Afghanistan's Drug Industry*. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and World Bank

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid*

shift was the changing nature and flow of resources to warlords and illegal armed groups. In the immediate aftermath of the Bonn Agreement in late 2001, the core group of Mujahedeen fighters that had captured Kabul from the Taliban, as the only cohesive local security formations available, was used to bring a modicum of stability. While these forces were organized under the Ministry of Defense, they were mainly loyal to a small number of key commanders. An important element in maintaining their loyalty was financial payments channeled through the Ministry of Defense. By late 2002, however, most payments by US military Special Forces to militia groups and warlord commanders appear to have been stopped, although there is speculation that some payments may have continued particularly in the southeast. This was in part due to the perception that in many parts of the country the war to defeat the Taliban was effectively over, but some groups in the east of Afghanistan, where a threat remained, appear to have been retained on the payroll. A key contributing factor was also that there was public exposure of a number of cases where Mujahedeen groups were implicated in human rights abuses. Direct payments from the US military began to dry up.

Resources to pay the armed groups were subsequently shifted to the Ministry of Defense, which was to pay the groups directly (through the budget). In theory at least, this should have provided the finances to ensure a degree of control over the armed groups involved. However, pervasive corruption in the Ministry of Defense meant that only a small proportion of the money budgeted for the purpose reached its intended beneficiaries. With the system of funding established to buy loyalty during the war weakened in this way, armed groups increasingly began to seek resources through the organized cultivation of opium poppy, opium trafficking, or selling of protection.<sup>110</sup>

While a key requirement was to disarm the formal militarized groups that had taken part in the fighting and ensure their reintegration into society, this process, given the socioeconomic realities of Afghanistan, could only achieve so much. A country-wide Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program, which had begun to be implemented in late 2003, completed its disarmament and demobilization components by mid-2005. The effort to effectively reintegrate these former soldiers into society; for example, the number of qualified applicants from the former militias able to join the new Afghan National Army (ANA) has been small.

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<sup>110</sup> Shaw, Mark. *Drug Trafficking and the Development of Organized Crime in Post-Taliban Afghanistan*. Afghanistan's Drug Industry. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and World Bank

Some armed militias had been excluded from the DDR process either because commanders had kept elements of their forces back as a form of security, or because some groups had never been part of the formal process and had no link with the Ministry of Defense. Unlike DDR which focused on recognized, structured military forces, DIAG is a program designed to disarm and demobilize armed militias operating outside formal military units. A third process, however, also has been underway: entry into the formal political process by former warlords and commanders. This in particular is having an important impact on who is involved in illicit drug trafficking as well as what roles they play. The corresponding development of a criminal "underworld" having complex relationships of pay-offs and patronage with political players, operating in the "upperworld".<sup>111</sup>

In the past, political parties were heavily involved in drug trafficking, particularly in the North of the country, whereas now the political parties and key individuals who are engaged in national politics want to distance themselves from drug trafficking, while retaining some of the advantages associated with the trade. "What used to be business conducted in the open", one senior Afghan official working in the Ministry of the Interior stated, "is now well hidden. The networks are still in place, but the organization is now fundamentally different". Former warlords turned politicians are reluctant to be seen to be associated with criminal activities. The increasing threat of internationally driven law enforcement interventions targeting well-known political players is also said to have been a key factor in making political figures much more cautious about direct involvement in drug trafficking. In many cases the individuals involved are said to have garnered enough resources from earlier involvement in illegal activities and are eager to legitimize themselves by integrating into the formal political process. What cannot be doubted, however, is that, given the volume of resources involved, many retain an interest in illegal activities and still receive resources from these activities in exchange for the "political protection" that they provide.<sup>112</sup>

The overall result of this process is that actual drug trafficking operations have been shifting into the hands of a limited number of key players, who have political connections but do not generally operate overtly in the political arena. These key traffickers, some of whom are relatively new players who have emerged in the last three years, are essentially self-styled "businessmen". In short, criminal activities such as trafficking are less overtly

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<sup>111</sup> Shaw, Mark. Drug Trafficking and the Development of Organized Crime in Post-Taliban Afghanistan. Afghanistan's Drug Industry. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and World Bank

<sup>112</sup> Ibid

the business of political leaders and more the province of an emerging criminal underworld with strong political connections. Despite the separation between the political "upperworld" and the criminal "underworld", it must be emphasized that it remains impossible to operate in the latter without support from the former. This is achieved by compromising key state institutions to support criminal activities. Nowhere is this process clearer than in the Ministry of Interior.

In the initial period after the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, the Ministry of Defense was a pivotal institution in the political transition and the key focus of international attention. As this institution became progressively "cleaned up", the locus of interactions between state institutions and criminal interests shifted to the Ministry of Interior.

The Ministry of the Interior, in addition to being responsible for a number of other functions, also controls the police. The process of police reform and restructuring remains critical to the overall success of the transition to a stable democracy in Afghanistan. Police structures broke down during the Soviet occupation. Efforts to re-establish a professional police force were resumed in 1989 under then-President Najibullah, but were short-lived as conflict continued. Recent attempts at reforming the police have been hamstrung by the fact that there are very few professional police officers to form the foundation of any new force, with many former Mujahedeen unsuccessful at making the transition from guerrilla fighter to civilian police officer.<sup>113</sup>

But secondly, and less obviously, it provides a useful tool to effectively counter the growth of other competing criminal groups in profitable illegal markets. In short, there is evidence that the provision of state protection to organized criminal activities may often be linked to the appointment process for senior police officials at the provincial and district levels. The control of police structures at district and local levels, more than other influences, is often critical to the control of criminal activities.<sup>114</sup>

The Taliban could have controlled all the main trading routes in the country, but after its fall the situation on the roads worsened again. Restoration of numerous local taxes and customs duties took place, and warlords began to accumulate most of the taxes on smuggling. In particular, governor of Herat refused to share his profits from smuggling with Kabul and invested part of it in the restoration work on his territory.

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<sup>113</sup> Shaw, Mark. Drug Trafficking and the Development of Organized Crime in Post-Taliban Afghanistan. Afghanistan's Drug Industry. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and World Bank

<sup>114</sup> Ibid

If with the end of military actions the role of drug business in financing of 'war economy' dropped, other its functions – its role as one of the basis for regional shady economy and adaptation of lots of farmers – not only saved their urgency, but even became stronger. Moreover, decrease of intensity of military actions promoted development of drug business, which besides allowed dealers to compensate some of their losses from restoration of barriers on the transit routes in the conditions of ethno-political fragmentation. All that together with abrogation of opium ban and general weakening of central government, had created stimulus for the restoration of poppy cultivation and expanded opiates' production, including heroin, in Afghanistan.

Damage caused to Afghan farmers in the result of opium ban together with drought and lack of credit, inventory, and fertilizers for alternative crops and markets for these alternative crops, worsened their situation dreadfully. A lot of farmers owned money to dealers and traders, because they couldn't give back salaam. They didn't have opium to give back and all the money was converted according to day's prices. That made a lot of farmers, who cultivated poppy before the ban, sell their cattle or go to Pakistan to look for a job. This partly explains why even before the total fall of the Taliban – in the background of escalation of the situation connected with 9/11 and Afghanistan – Afghan farmers restored opium production despite low market prices. The total collapse of strict, even for Afghanistan, the Taliban regime, fragmentation of power and weakness of new Karzai's government, which was able to control only Kabul and couple of adjacent provinces with the external help, had promoted further drug production.

As the result cultivated areas increased from minimal (1685 ha) in 2001 to 30750 ha in 2002, which is more than 18 times.<sup>115</sup> UNODC, however, estimated cultivated areas in 2002 for two times more, which is 74 000 ha, than Americans.<sup>116</sup> Afghanistan thus got back its place of the biggest opium supplier in the world and also significant supplier of hashish. Despite restoration of poppy cultivation in such scope, American experts for some time kept to insist on significant shortening in opium production in compare with opium boom in 1990s,<sup>117</sup> ignoring the fact that opium production just didn't have time for total

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<sup>115</sup> International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR). – Washington, DC.:US Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Efforts, 2003

<sup>116</sup> Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Counter-Narcotics Directorate of the Government of Afghanistan. – Vienna: UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UN ODCCP), October 2003

<sup>117</sup> International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR). – Washington, DC.:US Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Efforts, 2003

restoration after opium ban. The further grow of production was evidence of this fact. In 2003 the cultivated areas increased to 80 000 ha and became equitable with 2000, which was 82 000 ha. As the result 2003 had the third place in the Afghan history for cultivated areas and second place for the harvest.<sup>118</sup> And already in 2004 the area of sowed poppy in Afghanistan reached its historical culmination.<sup>119</sup>

At the same time dangerous tendency was registered: the best soil was used for poppy cultivation. However, poppy crops took up only 1% of all cultivated land and 3% of all irrigated land in the country, in zones of drug production it was almost 10% of all land, and in some provinces more than 50% of all irrigated land.<sup>120</sup> It was partly connected with activation of restoration of irrigation system. Restoration work became possible through the end of wide-ranging war and renewal of foreign social and economic aid. If during 1990s the irrigation system was destroyed in some provinces thus much that people couldn't have cultivated even poppy, party restoration of that system lead to use of this land not for cultivation of legal crops but opium poppy.

Changes touched on allocation of poppy crops as well. If during the first year after the fall of the Taliban – in 2002 – 78% of all sown land and 77% of all produced opium, as during previous decade, was concentrated in three provinces - Helmand, Nangarhar, and Badakhshan, after which were Urozgan and Kandahar, during next year the situation had changed.<sup>121</sup>

Firstly, poppy cultivation became less intensive in some traditional provinces of its cultivation. In 2003 cultivated area in the main 'opium province' of 1990s - Helmand – dropped to 49%, arrived to the lowest level since 1994 (excepting 2001) and came to 19% of all poppy crops in the country. The cultivated area in Kandahar was reduced for 23%, came to 5% of all poppy crops in the country. The leader was Nangarhar (23% of all poppy crops) where, despite the growth of production to South from Khyber Pass, connecting Kabul with Peshawar significantly dropped in the Northern provinces, including

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<sup>118</sup> Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Counter-Narcotics Directorate of the Government of Afghanistan. – Vienna: UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UN ODCCP), October 2003

<sup>119</sup> International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR). – Washington, DC.:US Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Efforts, 2004

<sup>120</sup> Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Counter-Narcotics Directorate of the Government of Afghanistan. – Vienna: UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UN ODCCP), October 2003

<sup>121</sup> International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR). – Washington, DC.:US Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Efforts, 2003



Jalalabad.<sup>122</sup> UN experts incline to explain shortening of cultivated area in some main provinces by renewal of fight against drugs, which led to vanishing of poppy crops at least around big cities and along the main transportation routes.<sup>123</sup> However, this shortening was partly compensated by the fact that in Helmand and Kandahar, for instance, opium poppy crops just were moved to more distant and less available areas, including mountain valleys and slopes. In Urozgan cultivated area, reached 9% of all area in 2003, had also enlarged through cultivation in out-of-the-way places of the province.

Secondly, in the background of decrease of opium production in some Southern and Eastern provinces of the country its growth in the North was quite predictable and natural, especially in Badakhshan along the border with Tajikistan. If in record for this province 2001, when all the rest of Afghanistan suffered from the opium ban, cultivated area here almost tripled (for 152%), in 2002 its increased for 32%, in 2003 – 55%. As the result in 2003 Badakhshan were 16% of all poppy cultivated land in the country, which is seven times more than in 1994. And if earlier in Badakhshan poppy often was cultivated on less fat land, in 2003 95% of all poppy cultivated land was the best irrigated land. And in 2003 growth of crop capacity allowed to increase opium production in Badakhshan for 93%.<sup>124</sup>

Not less troubled tendency was expansion of commercial opium production to the new provinces, including those where it wasn't ever cultivated before or where its cultivation was minimal. As the result in 2003 opium poppy was cultivated in 23 out of 28 provinces.<sup>125</sup> The biggest progress was reached in central provinces of Afghanistan, where transport infrastructure was developed the most. In 2003 in UN survey for the first time was included Bamiyan and Wardak, and the biggest breakthrough was in Ghor province (for 72%). It took fifth place, pushed off Kandahar.<sup>126</sup> Reduction of cultivated areas in the North of Nangarhar was very largely compensated by its parallel cultivation in out-of-the-

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<sup>122</sup> Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Counter-Narcotics Directorate of the Government of Afghanistan. – Vienna: UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UN ODCCP), October 2003

<sup>123</sup> Ibid

<sup>124</sup> Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Counter-Narcotics Directorate of the Government of Afghanistan. – Vienna: UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UN ODCCP), October 2003

<sup>125</sup> Афганистан: обзор по опиуму в 2003 г. Резюме доклада УНП ООН и Управления по борьбе с наркотиками правительства Афганистана – М: УНП ООН, 2003

<sup>126</sup> Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Counter-Narcotics Directorate of the Government of Afghanistan. – Vienna: UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UN ODCCP), October 2003

way provinces to the North from Nanarhar - Laghman and Kunar.<sup>127</sup> Even in North-West of the country, where cultivation of opium poppy traditionally was minimal and came to not more than 6% of all cultivated land, from 2002 to 2003 poppy cultivation increased in eight times.

As opium production was spreading along the country, the number of farmers cultivated opium poppy increased as well. In 2003 264 thousand of Afghan families cultivated opium poppy, approximately 0.30 ha of poppy crop fell to the share of every family. When average size of the family is 6-7 people, opium production supported 1.7 million people or 7% of all Afghan population.<sup>128</sup> As supply was growing the prices for opium was cut<sup>129</sup>, which lead to the lowering of farmers' gain from 1.2 billion USD in 2002 to 1.02 billion USD in 2003, which was 23% of Afghan GDP for that year. Despite this, opium production was still more profitable and more stable than cultivation of any other crops. If from cultivation of 1 ha of wheat – the main alternative - farmer could have gained about 220 USD per year, average annual income of a family, which cultivated poppy on a field sized about 0.3 ha, was about 3900 USD in 2003, which was ten times more than wage of policeman or teacher.<sup>130</sup> Correspondingly, average income from the opium production per capita of people cultivating poppy, was three times more than average income per capita in the country.<sup>131</sup>

Income of opium traders in Afghanistan, which was about 1.3 billion USD in 2003, was just a little more than income of farmers (1.02billion USD).<sup>132</sup> At the same time aggregate opium profit of farmers and traders was more than 50% of Afghan GDP. Moving opium markets to more hidden places and growth of heroin production in Afghanistan became new tendencies in 2003.<sup>133</sup> The fact of significant growth of number of laboratories producing morphine and heroin can be traced due to frequent impressments of heroin on the Iranian and Tajik borders, and also interception of acetic anhydride,

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<sup>127</sup> Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Counter-Narcotics Directorate of the Government of Afghanistan. – Vienna: UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UN ODCCP), October 2003

<sup>128</sup> Афганистан: обзор по опиуму в 2003 г. Резюме доклада УНП ООН и Управления по борьбе с наркотиками правительства Афганистана – М: УНП ООН, 2003

<sup>129</sup> Ibid

<sup>130</sup> Ibid

<sup>131</sup> Ibid

<sup>132</sup> Ibid

<sup>133</sup> International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR). – Washington, DC.:US Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Efforts, 2003

precursor needed for heroin production. Numerous laboratories in Nangarhar and Helmand were compact and mobile, which rather abstracted its finding and annihilation. In heroin laboratories in Faizabad (Badakhshan) were used so much wood that prices for it became prohibitive for local inhabitants.<sup>134</sup>

What concerning further trafficking, is that after the fall of the Taliban the role of Pakistan, as transit country for transferring Afghan opiates to Iran and Turkey then to Europe, became more significant. In 2002 a half of all morphine and heroin produced in Afghanistan was transferred to Pakistan, 66% of that heroin later was transferred to Iran for further transition.<sup>135</sup> The main capacity of Afghan opiates came to Pakistani Belujistan in the South or to Northern-Western border zone ('tribal zone'). From Pakistan drugs went to Iran – to Iranian Belujistan by land, or by sea to Makkuran<sup>136</sup>, or by air to the main airports. Besides, a part of Afghan opiates, came to the 'tribal zone', went to Afghanistan again through Chitral<sup>137</sup> for further trafficking through the countries of Middle Asia. Forms of trans-border drug turnover had changed as well. Growth of heroin prices in Pakistan (up to 6 000 USD per kilo) promoted further fragmentation of drug business, which led to increase of small lots – 20-100 kilo – in drug turnover, which, in its turn, led to increase of number of transporters for the purpose of lowering the risk of potential loss of invested money.<sup>138</sup>

Parallel toughening of drug control measures in Iran made transit traders use other possible trafficking routes more active, which made Central Asian trafficking routes of 'Silk Road' very popular. Evaluation of significance of those two routes – traditional Balkan Route and new Central-Asian route – are rather different. According to Iranian government, only 65% of Afghan opiates went through Iranian territory at the beginning of 21<sup>st</sup> century. This data was confirmed by American sources, according to which 60-70% of

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<sup>134</sup> International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR). – Washington, DC.:US Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Efforts, 2003

<sup>135</sup> Opium Economy in Afganistan: An International Problem. UNODC Report. UN Pub. No. E. 03. XI. 6, 2003. – 226 P.

<sup>136</sup> Makkuran (Urdu/Persian: ماکران) is a semi-desert coastal strip in the south of Balochistan, in Iran and Pakistan, along the coast of the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman.

<sup>137</sup> Chitral or Chatrāl (Urdu: چترال) basically translated as *field* in the native language Khowar, is the name of the tribe, town, valley, river, district and former princely state in the Malakand Division of the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan.

<sup>138</sup> International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR). – Washington, DC.:US Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Efforts, 2003

all heroin, produced in Afghanistan, went through Balkan route to Europe.<sup>139</sup> At the same time, according to UNODC, from all the Afghan neighbors in 2000s the most significant profit from drug trafficking (2.2 billion USD) fell to the share of groups, working in the countries of Central Asia, then came Iran (1-1.3 billion USD) and Pakistan (400-800 million USD).<sup>140</sup> Thus we cannot assert prevalence of one of the two main trafficking routes at the beginning of 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The trafficking system is quite complex and it needs a good protection. The provision of protection to the trafficking pyramid is surprisingly difficult, with what several interviewees described as an in-built system of checks and balances. Protection is paid at all levels of the pyramid, although such payments are much more clearly regulated at its apex. Farmers may in some areas have to pay in order to cultivate their crops. The threat of opium poppy eradication has also introduced new protection payments into the system. The district chief of police (or an equivalent official) receives payment directly from traffickers in order to operate. The system of checks and balances operates when the key trafficker, who maintains relations with all of the other principal players, "checks" with both the district chief of police (or his equivalent) and his provincial counterpart as to the amounts that have been received. If the district police chief (or equivalent official) does not provide adequate payment (which means of course ensuring payment from others in the system), he runs the risk of being replaced (or killed).

In 2005 the south accounted for 50% of all opium produced in Afghanistan, with cultivation levels showing strong or very strong increases in three of the southern provinces during 2005 (Nimroz, Helmand, and Kandahar). The southwestern province of Farah also showed a strong increase.<sup>141</sup>

### **3.1 Contemporary political economy of Afghanistan.**

Despite the unquestionable advances that have been made since the Taliban were overthrown more than seven years ago—so many changes that seem so positive and conducive to Afghanistan's development— one fundamental problem remains. All may

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<sup>139</sup> International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR). – Washington, DC.:US Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Efforts, 2003

<sup>140</sup> Opium Economy in Afghanistan: An International Problem. UNODC Report. UN Pub. No. E. 03. XI. 6, 2003. – 226 P.

<sup>141</sup> Shaw, Mark. Drug Trafficking and the Development of Organized Crime in Post-Taliban Afghanistan. Afghanistan's Drug Industry. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and World Bank

rest on desperately weak foundations. An insurgent Taliban and a corrupt government threaten to undo all the progress that has been made in Afghanistan since 2001. Over the next year, two events will test the stability of Afghanistan's development: first, the influx of U.S. troops this summer under the Iraq-tested counter-insurgency expert General David Petraeus. Then, there are the presidential and parliamentary elections, scheduled for August 2009 and early 2010, respectively. The accomplishments made in Afghanistan could be undone if the hoped-for results from the influx of troops and the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections do not materialize.

Outside Kabul, the capital, Afghanistan today may not seem so different to outsiders from how it looked hundreds of years ago when the British arrived in the early nineteenth century, or when the Soviet Union invaded 30 years ago. Most of the country continues to live in self-contained, small villages outside of cities and towns. Houses are made out of straw and mud. Donkey carts are the only vehicles on wheels in most urban centers outside Kabul. Beyond the bonds of Islam, there is not a very strong sense of national unity. The years of conflict and a weak central government have forced most of the country back into self-sufficient, closed off communities. At a time when Afghanistan needs a strong, central government, the country—as it has been for most of its modern history—is more a collection of ethnic groups than a nation of Afghans. These divisions have played prominently in all efforts thus far to develop national institutions, such as a national military or police force or the development of social services, and will play a major part in the upcoming elections, postponed from May to late August of this year.

In the course of the wars that began with the Soviets, continued through a civil war between warring mujahedeen groups, and culminated with the Taliban, those who could leave—usually the wealthiest and most educated—have left or were killed. Distrust among Afghans of each other, of the government, and of foreigners is high. Most people are disappointed in Hamid Karzai's tenure as president, which has seen corruption spread as rapidly as the cultivation of opium, the nation's leading cash crop and a mainstay of the economic and social structure of the southern and southeastern provinces. Over the past four years, the Taliban has capitalized on the Afghan government's weakness, on the U.S. government's preoccupation with the Iraq war, on poppy sales, and on their fellow Afghans' fear to again become a major destabilizing force. Positive change in a peaceful Afghanistan will take time. But change in an Afghanistan with an ever-stronger Taliban presence would be impossible.

The UN declared the Taliban—which had outlawed the opium trade in the 1990s—was stockpiling poppies to raise prices, noting that, while there was a 19 percent reduction

in the amount of land devoted to opium in Afghanistan, the tonnage of opium produced in 2008 only dropped by 6 percent in the seven biggest poppy-producing provinces, where not coincidentally, the Taliban insurgency is strongest.

Male addicts plunge their families into poverty, unable to work in their drug-induced stupor, forcing women to shamefully leave their homes to beg for food and raise money for more drugs. Many of these families were Afghan refugees who had returned from Iran and Pakistan and been unable to find work. Government officials and human rights activists added that criminal kidnappings were on the rise, as addicts, hungry for their next hit, held wealthy Afghans for ransom. In the northeastern province of Badakhshan, a whole generation of young children is addicted to opium, drugged by their mothers to keep them quiet so the women can work. As poverty, unemployment, and food shortages have taken their toll, crime has skyrocketed. Kidnappings, carjackings, drug-related murders, and highway robberies are common occurrences.<sup>142</sup>

The hawala system, handling both financial transfers and currency exchange, was important in Afghanistan even before the war. But during the long period of conflict, and especially under the Taliban regime, the hawala markets fully replaced the formal banking system, providing people with the only facility to transfer money into and out of the country. Media and law enforcement investigations into the 9/11 terrorist attacks prompted criticism of the hawala system as one of the sources of criminal money laundering and terrorist financing in Central Asia and the Middle East. But in a country where an estimated 80-90% of economic activity is in the informal sector, it would be mistaken to presume that Afghanistan's hawala system, which is currently the most effective, reliable, and sometimes sole method for moving funds across the country, deals only with dirty money. On account of the Afghan government's and international community's commitment to combat Afghanistan's illicit narcotics production and trade, the pressure to launder drug money in the world's largest opium-producing country should not be underestimated. The hawala system was central to the survival of Afghanistan's economy through the long period of conflict. Today, hawala continues to be the system of choice for most cash payments, transfers, currency exchange, and remittances in the country. This is partly due to restricted public access to modern banking services. As of October 2005, 13 licensed banks were operating in Kabul, but their high fees, stringent policies and

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<sup>142</sup> Crane Mary It Becomes a River Afghanistan at a Crossroads WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • World Policy Institute SPRING 2009

minimum balance requirements alienate the local population, of which only 36% are literate.<sup>143</sup>

There are four major sources of externally generated income in the country: opium production and trafficking, unregulated trade in legitimate goods, remittances from abroad, and donor assistance. The narcotics sector has been by far the most important, adding value of US\$ 2.7 billion to an economy otherwise producing about US\$ 5.4 billion of goods and services in 2005.<sup>144</sup> A World Bank study found that the gains appear to accrue mainly to traffickers and commanders and only secondarily to farmers, many of whom are heavily indebted.<sup>145</sup> However, while some groups experience discrimination in accessing certain markets, the narcotics trade has fostered cooperation among all groups and regions. Even during the war between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, opium produced in Taliban areas was trafficked through Northern Alliance-controlled areas.

It is supported by the hawala system, which carries out the majority of the country's cash payments and transfers. Hawala dealers choose to label their money "black", but they do not readily associate this with a negative subtext. While many acknowledge that their clients predominantly consist of Afghan business traders (who regularly trade "legal" goods "illegally"), they are quick to defend themselves against accusations of dealing in "illegal business", such as drug money laundering. These examples illustrate how difficult it is to separate legitimate and illegal financial trading in a country such as Afghanistan where the economy has existed in a legal vacuum over a prolonged period of time.<sup>146</sup>

Official trade with countries in the region, such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and China, is gradually growing while attempts have been made to secure trade agreements between Afghanistan and several of its neighbors. In 2003, Afghanistan certified two trilateral transit and trade agreements (Afghanistan-Iran-India and Afghanistan-Iran-Tajikistan) and four bilateral transit and trade agreements (with Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and India). But the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (ATT) that was signed in 1965 by Pakistan and Afghanistan governs the most well-known and

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<sup>143</sup> Thompson Edwina A. The Nexus of Drug Trafficking and Hawala in Afghanistan. Afghanistan's Drug Industry. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and World Bank

<sup>144</sup> UNODC (2005). Afghanistan Opium Survey. UNODC (October).

<sup>145</sup> Byrd, William and Christopher Ward (2004). Drugs and Development in Afghanistan. World Bank Social Development Papers, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction, Paper No. 18 (December 2004).

[http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/67ByDocName/DrugsandDevelopmentinAfghanistan/\\$FILE/WP18\\_Web.pdf](http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/67ByDocName/DrugsandDevelopmentinAfghanistan/$FILE/WP18_Web.pdf)

<sup>146</sup> Thompson Edwina A. The Nexus of Drug Trafficking and Hawala in Afghanistan. Afghanistan's Drug Industry. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and World Bank

well-trodden trading routes in and out of the country. The Agreement grants freedom of transit between the territories via two land routes (Peshawar-Torkham and Chaman-Spin Boldak). It also guarantees that "no customs duties, taxes, dues, or charges of any kind whether national, provincial or municipal regardless of their name and purposes, shall be levied on traffic in transit".<sup>147</sup>

It is not surprising that smugglers seeking to avoid Pakistan's stringent taxes and duties on foreign goods have exploited this facility. Many of the items imported via the ATT, which range from fast-selling to high-end consumer goods, were never meant for sale in Afghanistan. During the transit process these items make a U-turn to be sold in the local bazaars, such as Peshawar's sprawling Karkhano market. This route provides an important conduit of smuggled goods in the region. Another important channel is the import of goods directly from Dubai or through Iran for subsequent unofficial re-export, mainly to Pakistan but also elsewhere.

The pressure to launder drug money in the world's largest opium producing country is arguably greater than ever before. The international community's commitment to combat Afghanistan's drug trafficking networks is complemented by an increased sense of domestic responsibility to tackle the problem. A government ministry has been established to deal exclusively with counter-narcotics, along with a dedicated counternarcotics police force. Various efforts to curb illicit drug flows at the border have also been stepped up, with the recently established Afghanistan Border Security Force manning key points along the border with Iran, one of the primary routes for export of opiates.<sup>148</sup>

First, domestic profits should not be confused with those amassed internationally. While the aggregate estimated value of the international trade in Afghan opiates is in the neighborhood of US\$ 40 billion, the total export value of opium to neighboring countries is estimated to be US\$ 2.7 billion in 2005. Gross revenues accruing to Afghan farmers are calculated to be on the order of US\$ 560 million, while Afghan traffickers are estimated to receive roughly US\$ 2.14 billion (UNODC, 2005a). Needless to say this is a very significant amount of money for a very poor post-conflict developing economy like that of Afghanistan to manage, especially in the absence of a fully operational banking system. The question remains as to in what amounts, which forms, and by what means drug money arrives in the country. The hawala system relies on the extensive networks of mainly Pashtun diaspora and refugee communities in Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Europe, and the

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<sup>147</sup> Thompson Edwina A. *The Nexus of Drug Trafficking and Hawala in Afghanistan*. Afghanistan's Drug Industry. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and World Bank

<sup>148</sup> Ibid



United Arab Emirates (UAE). The groups link to the political, religious, and socio-economic networks within the core countries of Central Asia, three of which share a border with Afghanistan, and well beyond the region to the Middle East, the UK, and the US. Dubai (UAE), China, Japan, and Germany are the main sources of imported goods for Afghan traders, while cities in Pakistan, UAE, and Saudi Arabia are the main transaction centers for the Afghan hawala markets. Dubai operates as the central "clearing house" for transactions. Although most drug hawaladars in Kandahar and Helmand identified London as their main source of drug orders, the payments are often routed to Afghan partners in UAE and Pakistan, where the money is reinvested or used to settle other transactions. Afghan hawala businesses make use of corresponding Pakistani networks, which often have greater reach in countries such as the UK.<sup>149</sup>

### **3.2 Reasons of ineffectiveness of counter narcotics politics.**

In spite of sporadic bursts of resistance to foreign and governmental troops and traditional intertribal clashes, the main level of intensity of military resistance in Afghanistan began to get low. However this fact didn't lead to shortage of drug production. In the conditions of transition from the Taliban regime to weak puppet Karzai's government, which didn't control the most territory of the country; cessation of military operations became additional factor, which made easier further growth and commercialization of opium politics.

However adaptive function of opium production as a livelihood for farmers had remained, role of drugs in 'war economy' decreased due to the cessation of the conflict. In these conditions shady side of opium economy gained self-contained meaning and interests, needs and regularity of development of drug business, as a part of regional and world drug business, came to the first place. Thus at conjecture of so called 'post-conflict restoration' in Afghanistan opium shady economy was blooming with a new strength.

It doesn't mean that Karzai's government hadn't made any efforts to fight drug business. January 17, 2002 temporary government of Afghanistan, under pressure of international society, issued an edict about ban of cultivation, production, treatment, trading, trafficking and use of drugs. However, this edict couldn't have had an effect on already sowed fields and harvest of 2002. Later edict coverage of cultivation ban was

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<sup>149</sup> Thompson Edwina A. The Nexus of Drug Trafficking and Hawala in Afghanistan. Afganistan's Drug Industry. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and World Bank

limited to provinces, which were more or less controlled by central government, with the help of international coalition or local leaders, directly connected with them.<sup>150</sup>

We cannot say, that Afghan authorities, with the international support, didn't make efforts to realize their plans and make edicts and various declarations work in Afghanistan. Firstly, setting of Drug Enforcement Commission didn't justify itself, because fight against drugs demanded more centralized and concentrated efforts. Under pressure of Western countries, first of all Great Britain and USA, in September – October 2002 functions of drug control were included in the jurisdiction of National Security Council, within which Department on Drugs was created. Four main field of work included creation of alternative livelihood for farmers, control and police measures, reform of legislation, and decrease of demand on drugs. Government planned to organize special Drug Enforcement Administration within Ministry of Interior.<sup>151</sup> Nevertheless, efforts for edict realization in Afghanistan were not systemic and didn't bring any visible results. Reports on drug impressments and arrests of drug traders in Kabul and other provinces of the country, on closing drug markets in Nangarhar and Helmand were very fragmentary, and systematic data gathering on progress of crops eradication wasn't carried on.

Already in spring 2002 temporary government, with the support of Great Britain, began poppy eradication campaign, first of all, in Helmand and Nangarhar. According to special executive order of Temporary Administration from April 3, 2002, farmers supposed to have compensation for eradicated poppy.<sup>152</sup> However, the size of the compensation was obviously underestimated, and, besides, it was cut off all the time. For instance, in some areas in Nangarhar province instead of promised 350 USD for 1 jarib compensation was cut off till 50-70 USD for jarib. Of course, this provoked discontent and protests of farmers. In Jalalabad farmers demanded on 3000 USD for 1 ha for giving up poppy cultivation instead of offered 350 for 1 ha.<sup>153</sup> By 2003 the compensation program

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<sup>150</sup> Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Counter-Narcotics Directorate of the Government of Afghanistan. – Vienna: UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UN ODCCP), October 2003

<sup>151</sup> International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR). – Washington, DC.: US Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Efforts, 2003

<sup>152</sup> Goodhand J. From Holy War to Opium War? A Case Study of the Opium Economy in North Eastern Afghanistan. Peace Building and Complex Political Emergencies Working Paper №5. – Manchester: Univ. of Manchester, 1999. <[http://www.fsa.ulaval.ca/personnel/vernag/EH/F/noir/lectures/Afghanistan\\_drogue.htm](http://www.fsa.ulaval.ca/personnel/vernag/EH/F/noir/lectures/Afghanistan_drogue.htm)>

failed, and government had to use other measures for farmers' encouragement, for example, giving small loans and subsidizing cultivation of alternative crops. However, as practice shows, in case of forced refusal from poppy cultivation farmers tended not to cultivate alternative crops but go to work in Pakistan. Attempts to call for religious feelings of farmers didn't have success as well. In conditions of absence of strict Taliban control and repressive instruments religious arguments of new government, who didn't have any religious authority among population, were idle.

The main and practically the only key factor were big fines for poppy cultivation. Armed officials were visiting village after village and were trying to convince farmers to give up poppy cultivation.<sup>154</sup> However, for instance, in Nangarhar in some cases farmers blocked tractors, in which officials were travelling, on the way to the village and fine for poppy cultivation was transformed to bribe (about 50 USD for 1 jarib) and officials closed their eyes on continued poppy cultivation. Thus in reality government didn't compensate farmers for giving up poppy cultivation it was farmers who gave bribes for continuing production. Quite often officials, after demonstrative eradication in some provinces, gave farmers 8-days postponement on other field in order for them to have time to gather poppy pitch.<sup>155</sup> Of course, corruption connected with drugs wasn't limited by regional and local level. And, however, we cannot say that Karzai's government encouraged poppy cultivation and opium production or laundering money within the country, connection of high officials with these illegal activities cannot be denied completely.<sup>156</sup>

In total, according to Afghan authorities, which cannot be actually checked, 21 430 ha of opium poppy was eradicated in Afghanistan by October 2003.<sup>157</sup> However, attempts to present these eradication measures as the main factor of reduction of poppy cultivation during 2002-2003 were unconvincing. At the beginning of 2000s opium production just didn't have enough time to rehabilitate after opium ban imposed by the Taliban. However, the same sources have to admit, that poppy eradication didn't have effect on opium

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<sup>153</sup> Goodhand J. From Holy War to Opium War? A Case Study of the Opium Economy in North Eastern Afghanistan. Peace Building and Complex Political Emergencies Working Paper №5. – Manchester: Univ. of

<sup>154</sup> Afghanistan: Focus on Poppy Eradication // UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN). – 2003. – 21 Jan.

<http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=31836>.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid

<sup>156</sup> International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR). – Washington, DC.:US Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Efforts, 2003

<sup>157</sup> Афганистан: обзор по опию в 2003 г. Резюме доклада УНП ООН и Управления по борьбе с наркотиками правительства Афганистана – М: УНП ООН, 2003

production in Afghanistan.<sup>158</sup> In these conditions government's plan to reduce area of poppy cultivation for 70% in four years (since 2004 to 2007) looked absolutely unrealistic.

Drug measures, undertaken by new Afghan authorities with support of external donors and international organizations, became rather one of the factors, which had influence on changes in drug business and its geography, which became less concentrated but more widespread. At the same time drug measures didn't have any effect on the scope of drug production and drug trade in Afghanistan. Although, concrete drug measures were needed and were required in systematization and toughening, liquidation drug based economy was remained the main task. In conditions, when drug business together with drug smuggling were those activities, which brought stable profit for the whole layers of the population, any measures to fight it could have had only minimal result, and, at the same time, authorities were always tempted to join this shady business at some point.

Lack or ineffectiveness of international support in restoration of Afghanistan during post-Taliban period could worsen the situation. On one hand, international financial and socio-economic support during this period grew significantly. External support became the most considerable infusion in legal Afghan economy and, it was, together with agriculture and gas mining, the main economic resource of Afghanistan. On the other hand, international support had ambiguous and often unpredictable consequences. It became one of pressure instruments on different political groups within Afghanistan, which were actively used for recognition of new Kabul government. At the same time fight for access to the international support itself became an important component of inner political struggle in Afghanistan. Another example is irrigation system, restored on the international money, which had to develop agriculture, but in some provinces it helped to support opium production. Another example is humanitarian aid, food supply, however, in 2002 its capacity reached 250 thousand tons, flour remained the main product, but not seeds, which would have allowed farmers to diverse their crops at least partially.

What touches targeted international support, provided for fight against drugs, countries of European Union, which are mainly the main consumer of Afghan drugs, limited their participation by financing through UN. Great Britain became an exception; it headed support to Afghanistan in fight against drugs inside the country and formation of special eradication department. US activity was limited by 'support of leading role of Great Britain'.<sup>159</sup> It can be explained by the fact that Afghan drugs didn't threaten USA. In these

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<sup>158</sup> International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR). – Washington, DC.:US Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Efforts, 2003-2004

<sup>159</sup> Ibid

conditions “indirect contribution” of USA was its participation in some projects in frames of common restoration program, for example, creation of new working places for Afghans in construction, mine cleaning, etc., and also working up a regional plan for substitution of poppy cultivation with alternative crop, such as cotton and vine.<sup>160</sup> USA also supported Pakistan in its fight against drugs.<sup>161</sup>

In general, however, international donors paid obviously little attention to the drug problem in the region. In spite of the fact that, for example, in Pakistan already in 1990s with massive American pressure drug production was considerably cut off there was no progress with fighting against production and trade of Afghan drugs on Pakistani territory. In this connection special attention has to be paid to special regional plan for coordination of traditional (police, customs) drug measures. It was passed in September 2000 by Group of friends and neighbors of Afghanistan (Group 6+2) under the aegis of UN.

Task of effective resistance to drug business in this and other regions could not be reached only by means of strengthening law-enforcement system, border control and other force and police measures. It demanded more efforts in finding basics of regional shady economy and creation of conditions for alternative livelihoods. Actually, this approach was formatted in UN, which had the leading role in coordination of international restoration program, connected with decrease on drug production in Afghanistan. This approach based on encouragement of cultivation of alternative crops and creation of new possibilities of legal income in non-agricultural sector.

However, even working out of appropriate international approach, aimed at creation of alternative economy, hardly could have brought any results in conditions of weakness and ineffectiveness of Afghan state, which could not have properly controlled territory of the country. As practice shows, whichever massive and long-term international support was, the key factor in fight against drugs remains efficiency of national authorities. That is why progress in fight against drugs in Afghanistan depends on consolidation of the state. In this context interference in inner Afghan affairs after fall of Taliban had very contradictory meaning. On one hand, international society rendered significant financial, technical, military and other assistance to central Afghan government, especially in sphere of state building. On the other hand, at the beginning of 2000s international support

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<sup>160</sup> International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR). – Washington, DC.:US Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Efforts, 2003-2004

<sup>161</sup> International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR). – Washington, DC.:US Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Efforts, 2002

continued to come in directly to local and regional leaders, including warlords, strengthening their financial and economical independence from central government.

Despite these advances, Afghanistan remains one of the least-developed countries in the world—far less developed than Iraq. In 2008, Afghanistan ranked 174 out of 178 countries on the United Nations 2008 global human development index, a composite indicator that measures education, longevity, and economy performance. The only countries in worse shape, according to the UN are: Burkina Faso, Mali, Sierra Leone, and Niger. Then, there is the illicit opium trade. In August 2008, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime released the latest update to its annual Afghanistan Opium Survey, which showed opium cultivation rose to 235,700 ha in 2007.<sup>162</sup>

The positive moment is that the number of opium-free provinces increased from 13 to 18, including the eastern province of Nangarhar, which had until 2007 been Afghanistan's second-largest poppy-producing region.<sup>163</sup> In 2005 there was a concerted effort on the part of the provincial authorities in Nangarhar to eliminate opium poppy cultivation in the province. The result was a 96% fall in the level of cultivation between the 2003/04 and 2004/05 growing seasons. The process of implementing the ban learned much from the Taliban's experience in 2000/01. In particular, emphasis was placed on preventing the planting of the crop itself and on working through district and local power structures. As with the Taliban ban, promises of development assistance were made to communities in return for compliance with the ban. The ban imposed by the provincial authorities had a wide-reaching impact extending well beyond opium poppy farmers across a variety of different groups. In contrast, households most dependent on opium poppy and who typically cultivated it most intensively were found to adopt coping strategies in response to the ban that not only highlighted their growing vulnerability but threatened their long-term capacity to move out of illicit drug crop cultivation. The loss of on-farm income that this group experienced was not offset even in part by an increase in cultivation of high-value licit crops. This was due to constraints on irrigated land, the distance to markets, and the increasing control of "local officials", who are gaining over trade in licit goods. Instead, opium poppy was replaced by wheat, but due to land shortages and the density of population wheat production was typically insufficient even to meet families' basic food

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<sup>162</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2008 World Drug Report

[http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/wdr07/WDR\\_2007.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/wdr07/WDR_2007.pdf)

<sup>163</sup> Crane Mary It Becomes a River Afghanistan at a Crossroads WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • World Policy Institute SPRING 2009

requirements. The loss of off-farm income (up to five months' employment) during the weeding and harvest season for opium poppy could not be replaced by intermittent wage labour opportunities at less than half the daily rate paid during the opium poppy harvest.

For this group, problems in accessing new loans were compounded by inability to pay accumulated debts. Expenditures on basic food items were reduced; children were withdrawn from higher education; and livestock, household items, and prior investments in licit income streams, where households had them, were sold. The resource-poor were also more likely to send members of their family to find employment in Pakistan, and typically were the most vociferous in their opposition to the government for its imposition of the ban and to the foreign countries they believed to be behind it.

It is also important to note that it is not just in the Kabul river basin of Nangarhar that there is evidence of increasing agricultural diversification and investments in high-value horticulture. Laghman, Badakhshan, Balkh, and even Farah are showing similar changes in patterns of behavior. Furthermore, even within the districts in Nangarhar where over the years opium has been more entrenched and where households are more dependent on cultivating opium poppy as a means of livelihood, there is an increasing tendency to reduce, or even shift out of opium poppy cultivation, mainly in areas in close proximity to the district center.<sup>164</sup>

The bad news was that much of the decreased production was attributed not so much to better enforcement—though good local governance did play a part—but to drought and to an oversupply of poppies already on the market. The potential export value of opium production in 2005 is estimated by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime at US\$2.7 billion. This compares with the contribution of the drug sector to overall economic activity of less than 2% in Colombia, the world's main producer of cocaine, with 57% of world supply.

Counter-narcotics efforts have relied on a multi-pronged approach, aimed at combating cultivation and trafficking through eradication and interdiction while providing farmers with alternative livelihoods. Eradication involves destruction of opium growing in fields and may be associated with sanctions against opium farmers. Interdiction consists of arresting drug traffickers and processors, seizing opium and heroin, destruction of processing laboratories, and closing opium markets. Providing farmers leaving the opium economy with short- and/or long-term alternative livelihoods. However, the concept of alternative livelihoods has been widened to cover all components of rural development, including farm and off-farm income. In 2003 the Government adopted a multi-year

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<sup>164</sup> Afghanistan's Drug Industry. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and World Bank

counter-narcotics strategy, which aimed at reducing opium production by 75% in five years and completely eliminating it within ten years, while emphasizing the importance of alternative livelihood programs. Counter-narcotics strategy was identified as a fundamental cross-cutting issue for national development. More specifically, the Government intends to intensify and better coordinate efforts, with a view to: building strong institutions; enhancing law enforcement and interdiction; continuing eradication efforts; reducing demand for narcotics and increasing treatment of drug addicts; strengthening criminal justice; increasing public awareness; promoting international and regional cooperation; and developing sustainable alternative livelihoods. The Ministry of Interior, with help from the international community, has established the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), which comprises three sections: investigation, intelligence, and interdiction. The Central Poppy Eradication Force (CPEF) was established in May 2004 to carry out eradication.<sup>165</sup>

In November 2004 the position of Deputy Minister for Counter-Narcotics was created in the Ministry of Interior to oversee and coordinate counter-narcotics enforcement activities. A Criminal Justice Task Force was established and has convicted over 90 traffickers since May 2005. And in December 2004, the Government established the Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) to coordinate and oversee its counter-narcotics policies. The Government recently approved a new counter-narcotics law, which lays out significant penalties for corruption and bribery associated with drug trafficking; establishes the procedures for investigating and prosecuting major drug-trafficking offences; establishes the MCN as the leading body to monitor, evaluate, and coordinate all counter-narcotics activities; and provides for creation of new tribunals for drug traffickers and drug regulation commissions. UNODC estimates indicate that opium output declined by 2% in 2005 to 4,100 tons: a 21% drop in cultivation was largely offset by a rebound in yields due to favorable weather. The decline in opium cultivation was largely due to decisions by many farmers not to plant in anticipation of intensified government counter-narcotics efforts, and promises of alternative livelihoods programs. The decline was particularly marked in the five largest opium producing provinces, which accounted for 68% of production in 2004, and where output declined by 53%.<sup>166</sup>

Cultivation in other provinces increased by 48%, reflecting the drug economy's ability to relocate in response to counter-narcotics efforts. Reflecting a slight decline in prices, export and farm-gate values declined by 4% and 7%, respectively, to US\$2.7 billion

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<sup>165</sup> Afghanistan's Drug Industry. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and World Bank

<sup>166</sup> Ibid



and US\$560 million. Although counter-narcotics efforts so far have not had the desired degree of success, the expansion of the drug economy over the last few years might well have been more vigorous in their absence.<sup>167</sup>

As we see, the core of the problem cannot be limited by the role of drug business in this long military conflict in Afghanistan. We should talk about interaction of those both things. On one hand, military conflict in Afghanistan became one of the stimulus for prosperity of drug business directly as well as by weakening of the government and its control over the country. On the other hand, opium production became the basis for “self-reproductive war economy”, which was slowing down the process of peace settlement, and process of formation of national legal economy. So, with time, we have there a vicious circle: drug business protracted the military conflict and further weakening of the state.

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<sup>167</sup> Afghanistan's Drug Industry. Report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and World Bank

## Conclusion

In 20<sup>th</sup> century the problem of drug business and drug trafficking came up repeatedly in different regions of the world, which was connected with particular circumstances. Geography of this problem is huge; there is no single country in the world which has not suffered from drug business. At our times drug business has massive zone of influence. All the countries in the world participate in production, trade, use and trafficking of illegal substances. And this business plays by the same rules as all the other businesses – developed countries consume product that produced by third world countries.

Different nature of drug business, as a branch of shady economy, and military socio-political, ethno-political and other conflicts exclude their total mutual incorporation and limit frames of their interconnection. Nevertheless, such interconnection exists, especially in the regions of massive drug production, where military conflicts and drug business influence each other in complex interaction with other socio-economical and political factors. There is a regional shady economy with the center in the zone of long military conflict functioning in the region, discussed in this work. Since the beginning of the conflict lots of attempts was made to stop it. More than 20 years different forces inside and outside the country were fighting trying to bring “peace” to Afghanistan.

In the foreword of the Angelo Rasanayagam’s book he quoted Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, Former UN Coordinator for Afghanistan and UN High Commissioner for Refugees, who asks rhetorical question: “Can Afghanistan emerge, Phoenix-like, as a viable and stable state, despite (or because of) US involvement and future ‘pipeline politics’? In the last few decades Afghanistan has faced the imposition of a ruthless communist regime, following the monarchy and the short-lived Daoud republic, only to have the resulting chaos of warlords and infighting replaced by an obscurantist and retrograde foreign import known as Taliban. Can a return to the wisdom of the traditional *jirgas*<sup>168</sup> overcome the fragmentation, the destruction and the appalling suffering after so many years of conflict?”

At first all seemed to augur well for the launching if a process of national-building in country where the state was destroyed by over 20 years of continuous civil war and anarchy. In the pre-modern ‘zone of chaos’, the Taliban had imposed, by force of arms and

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<sup>168</sup> A *jirga* (occasionally *jirgah*) (Pashto: *مډرغ*) is a tribal assembly of elders which takes decisions by consensus, particularly among the Pashtun but also in other ethnic groups near them; they are most common in Afghanistan and among the Pashtun in Pakistan near its border with Afghanistan and are even held by Pashtuns in Kashmir valley, India.

with foreign help, a threadbare, regressive, religiously motivated regime of the most primitive kind, nihilistic and totalitarian. A ruthlessly like-minded syndicate of Islamic zealots of foreign origin hijacked the country for the use as a convenient base for its world-wide terrorist operations. The armed intervention of the United States in response to the 9/11 attacks of al-Qaeda on its soil, endorsed and supported by the international community in a 'coalition against terror', was successful in attaining not only its primary objective of destroying the al-Qaeda infrastructure but also in bringing about a relatively painless change of regime that came as a relief to the long-suffering population.

The political process that began in Bonn in December 2001, with the constitution of an Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA), acquired domestic legitimacy in the international Afghan manner through the Loya Jirga of June 2002. In keeping with the time-table agreed upon in Bonn, a new Afghan Constitution was adopted in January 2004, and both the presidential and parliamentary elections were scheduled to be held not later than June 2004. At the international conference held in Berlin in April 2004 to re-assess Afghanistan's reconstruction needs, it was declared that an elected president should be accountable to an elected parliament, with the implication that the elections should be held simultaneously. This may have been at the insistence of the Bush administration, for its own domestic reasons.<sup>169</sup>

The greatest failure of the international community in general, and the Bush administration in particular, was the failure to provide President Karzai and his interim government with the international forces required, in the absence of a national army and police force, to sustain the momentum of securing and stabilizing post-war Afghanistan.

The Afghan warlords bore the primary responsibility for the anarchy that prevailed after the fall of the communist regime in 1992 but had performed poorly in resisting the rise of the Taliban. They were given new opportunities to rebuild their power when they were armed and re-equipped in the run-up to Operation Enduring Freedom. It was the fear of reprisals by the mainly non-Pushtun anti-Taliban forces of the Northern Alliance that occupied Kabul after the collapse of the Taliban that prompted the UN Security Council to authorize the dispatch of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). But the ISAF mandate, endorsed by the provisional Afghan government in its official act, was limited to the policing of the multiethnic city of Kabul.<sup>170</sup>

So many years passed but international community still bother about Afghanistan for several reasons. One of them drugs, which are going to Europe and other countries of

<sup>169</sup> Rasanayagam, Angelo, *Afghanistan. A modern history..* I.B. Tauris 2005. 311 p

<sup>170</sup> Rasanayagam, Angelo, *Afghanistan. A modern history..* I.B. Tauris 2005. 311 p

Middle East despite all the difficulties connected with on-going war. Opiates remain the main problem drug in terms of treatment. This, combined with the enormous increases in production we are now witnessing, necessitate the rigorous monitoring of demand in the opiate market. While demand has been relatively stable at the global level, the countries surrounding Afghanistan continue to experience increasing levels of use. Increases were also recorded for most countries of East and Southern Africa. However, consumer markets in Western and Central Europe seem to be largely stable.<sup>171</sup>

At the same time we cannot say that blooming of drug business and drug trafficking necessarily leads to the conflict and vice versa. We talk about interaction of drug business and military conflict. Presence of drug business in the conflict economy is much more visible than influence of the conflict on the drug business.

Of course, drug business itself can provoke violence, for instance, in near-boundary zones between main states-producers of drugs and their neighbors, mainly transit countries, instability almost always exists. But if we talk about a conflict, which is wider than just near-boundary instability, for instance, full-scale civil war or long ethno-political resistance in the region of drug production or even in the transit-countries, then drug business became one of the war sources for participants. As one of the most profitable branches of shady economy, drug business is not only stable source of income but, in some cases, it gives them possibility of total financial independence.

Groups, participating in local and regional conflicts, generally feel acute need in finances and look for ways to provide themselves and their participation in the conflict with finances – first of all, with the help of illegal, shady economy. Thus the closest connection of drug business with rebel and other armed groups was formed in the regions of large-scale drug cultivation and drug production. These regions are almost all the time controlled by armed resistance groups in the drug productive regions. The closest connections with drug business have those resistance groups, which are still waging partisan war, controlling particular territory for a long time and at least partially pay attention to the local peasants and farmers.

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<sup>171</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2008 World Drug Report  
[http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/wdr07/WDR\\_2007.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/wdr07/WDR_2007.pdf)

Participation in drug trafficking is more typical for military organizations of different type, for instance, for trans-border tribal union, including founded in narco-states, and for organizations, acting mostly on the territories of transit countries.

We should also notice that drug business is absolutely apolitical. It, as all shady economy, is never under military conflict. While it is almost endless source of finance for the conflict and it promotes procrastinating of the conflict, drug business keeps its own dynamic of development and logic at the same time. Thus the role of drug business isn't limited by financing of the conflict, drug business is multifunctional and it not only keeps traditional shady economical function, but also plays an important role in strategic livelihood for whole layers of population.

The influence of military conflicts themselves on the development and drug trade is different and depends on dynamic. In Afghanistan drug production began to grow during the recent years. Afghanistan's higher yielding opium poppy led to a second year of global opium production increases. Opium production almost doubled between 2005 and 2007, reaching 8,870 mt in 2007, a level unprecedented in recent years.<sup>172</sup>

What touches counter-narcotics actions we can say that totalitarian Taliban regime had the most results. However, we cannot say that only strict political power can fight drugs successfully, especially in conflict or post-conflict conditions.

The same could be said about fight with illegal drug production and trade during long military conflict or beginning process of peace building. The total incorporation of counter-narcotics and counter-partisan strategies, as well as total changeling one for another, not only keeps the problem but can totally worsen it. Counter-partisan strategy is ineffective in fight against drugs and vice versa.

Of course, the problem of finances for military resistance groups is not limited by drug business, as shady business in general. Legal sources of finance play important role as well. In these conditions we cannot compare these resistance groups with criminal organizations. This is very relevant when speak about terroristic organizations.

And which situation we have today in Afghanistan? Tom Lasseter in his article 'Thriving Afghan drug trade has friends in high places' writes: "When it's harvest time in the poppy fields of Kandahar, dust-covered Taliban fighters pull up on their motorbikes to collect a 10 percent tax on the crop. Afghan police arrive in Ford Ranger pickups - bought

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<sup>172</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2008 World Drug Report  
[http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR\\_2008/Executive%20Summary.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2008/Executive%20Summary.pdf)

with U.S. aid money - and demand their cut of the cash in exchange for promises to skip the farms during annual eradication.

Then, usually late one afternoon, a drug trafficker will roll up in his Toyota Land Cruiser with black-tinted windows and send a footman to pay the farmers in cash. The boss inside the Land Cruiser never shows his face, but the farmer says he presumes it's a local powerbroker, who has ties to the U.S.-backed Afghan government.”<sup>173</sup>

Looks like nothing had changed for the last decade, which allows us to presume that in greater way military conflict influences drug business not directly, but when it promotes weakness of the government and interrupt the process of stabilization of state authorities, which is the main tool of counter-narcotics strategy. There is one thing that we can be sure about is that this fight against drugs cannot succeed before the structural possibilities of the illegal organizations would be destroyed and local agrarian politics would be changed.

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<sup>173</sup> Lasseter, Tom ‘Thriving Afghan drug trade has friends in high places writes’  
<http://www.individual.com/story.php?story=100888382>

Appendix 1





Source: <http://www.geopium.org>



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